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JILL WIEBER LENS** 
Abstract: Abortion rights are more vulnerable now than they have been in decades. 
This Article focuses specifically on the most assailable subset of those rights: the 
right to a pre-viability, second-trimester abortion. Building on Carhart v. Gonzales, 
in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal ban on a safe and effective second-
trimester abortion procedure, states have passed new second-trimester abortion re-
strictions that rely heavily on the woman-protective rationale—the idea that the re-
strictions will benefit women. These newer second-trimester abortion restrictions 
include bans on the Dilation & Evacuation procedure, bans on disability-selective 
abortions, and mandatory perinatal hospice and palliative care counseling in cases 
of life-limiting fetal conditions. This Article discusses the paternalism and tradi-
tional gender stereotypes underlying these newer abortion restrictions and uses em-
pirical studies to discredit the woman-protective rationale justifying them. The Ar-
ticle also suggests a radical, new response to claims that women need protection 
from second-trimester abortion: the embrace of second-trimester abortion “danger-
talk.” First introduced in medical literature by abortion providers, dangertalk refers 
to the uncomfortable truths about abortion that supporters often avoid. These topics 
include the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures and the emotional com-
plexity that can especially accompany second-trimester abortion. This Article ad-
vocates for greater openness about these topics, arguing that silence only capitu-
lates the narrative of second-trimester abortion to those opposing abortion rights. 
The Article envisions second-trimester abortion care that more openly recognizes 
these realities and provides women with more choices that might make second-
trimester abortion easier, including alternative procedures and the option of 
memory-making to process difficult emotions, like grief. Finally, this Article argues 
that more transparency about these difficult subjects will help rebut the woman-
protective rationale used to justify second-trimester abortion restrictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the confirmation of Justice 
Amy Coney Barrett renew and inflame existing fears about the future of abor-
tion rights in the United States. Many are reasonably worried about the fate of 
Roe v. Wade,1 as interpreted by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey,2 given that the newly composed Supreme Court recently an-
nounced that it will hear a case that challenges its central holding.3 The case, 
Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Dobbs, involves a ban on abortion 
after fifteen weeks, before the fetus is viable.4 The Court granted certiorari on 
the very broad question of whether all pre-viability abortion bans are unconsti-
tutional. That Roe and Casey prohibited pre-viability bans is the very reason 
that numerous lower federal courts have found other second-trimester abortion 
restrictions unconstitutional. For instance, lower courts have held unconstitu-
tional state bans on a second-trimester abortion procedure known as Dilation 
and Evacuation (D&E)5 and state bans on abortion due to fetal anomaly.6 If the 
Court in Dobbs concludes that some pre-viability abortion bans are constitu-
tionally permissible—as many suspect it will—the constitutionality of these 
other second-trimester restrictions is immediately in question.7 
Numerous state laws specifically target second-trimester abortion even 
though it is rare in the United States—fewer than 7% of abortions occur after 
thirteen weeks of pregnancy.8 Women9 need second-trimester abortions for a 
                                                                                                                           
1 410 U.S. 113, 164–66 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992).  
2 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992). 
3 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in part, 
No. 19-1392, 2021 WL 1951792 (U.S. May 17, 2021). 
4 Id. 
5 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 960 F.3d 785 (6th Cir.) (holding Ken-
tucky’s D&E law unconstitutional), cert. granted in part sub nom., Cameron v. EMW Women’s Sur-
gical Ctr., P.S.C., 141 S. Ct. 1734 (2021). But see Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, No. 17-51060, 
2021 WL 3661318 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding Texas’s ban on the D&E procedure constitutional). See 
generally Mary Ziegler, What’s Next for Abortion Law?, BOS. REV. (Sept. 1, 2020), http://boston
review.net/politics-law-justice/mary-ziegler-whats-next-abortion-law [https://perma.cc/YE6U-LQXM] 
(discussing the future of abortion laws in the United States). 
6 See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 
300, 316 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d in part, Box v. Planned Parenthood of 
Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (finding Indiana’s ban unconstitutional). But see Preterm-
Cleveland v. Himes, 940 F.3d 318 (6th Cir.), vacated, 944 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 2019), rev’d en banc sub 
nom., Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2021) (finding Ohio’s prohibition 
against abortions for reason of Down Syndrome constitutional). 
7 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d at 316. 
8 See CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm [https://perma.cc/W69C-XX5Z] 
(citing data from 2018); see also infra Part I and accompanying text (discussing the occurrence of 
first- and second-trimester abortions). 
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variety of reasons: a later discovery of pregnancy, changed circumstances after 
an initial decision to keep the pregnancy, the need to save money for the pro-
cedure, or a fetal or maternal health condition discovered during pregnancy.10 
Adolescents, women with less education, and Black women are more likely to 
need second-trimester abortions.11 Despite its rarity, second-trimester abortion 
consumes enormous attention in the abortion debates and public support for 
abortion in the second trimester drops dramatically.12 
Perhaps the largest anti-abortion victory in the last twenty years is the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,13 which affirmed a federal ban 
on a safe second-trimester abortion procedure known as Dilation and Extrac-
tion (D&X).14 Underpinning the Court’s decision was the idea that the D&X 
was so “gruesome” that women would suffer emotional distress and regret if 
they later learned the specifics of the procedure.15 Importantly, this victory was 
not simply limited to the legal realm—the campaign also successfully reduced 
public support for abortion generally by inundating Americans with pictures of 
fetal parts and intentionally evocative descriptions of second-trimester abortion 
procedures.16 
Carhart entrenched into law the idea that women need protection from 
abortion procedures. The woman-protective rationale remains the argument of 
the most sophisticated anti-abortion advocates.17 It attempts to nullify Casey’s 
fundamental assumption that abortion benefits women,18 freeing the Court to 
overturn abortion precedent. The rationale is also important because of its le-
gitimizing role—reframing abortion restrictions as protective, not harmful, to 
                                                                                                                           
9 Trans men also need reproductive healthcare, including abortion. Many reproductive justice 
scholars are moving to adopt gender neutral language when discussing reproductive health in recogni-
tion of this fact, which we support. In this Article, however, we have opted to continue using gendered 
language because so much of our argument relies on gender stereotypes that are hard to capture and 
discuss without a reference to gender. 
10 See infra Part I and accompanying text (discussing the reasons women obtain second-trimester 
abortions). 
11 See infra Part I and accompanying text. 
12 David Crary & Hannah Fingerhut, AP-NORC Poll: Most Say Restrict Abortion After 1st Tri-
mester, AP NEWS (June 25, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/only-on-ap-us-supreme-court-abortion-
religion-health-2c569aa7934233af8e00bef4520a8fa8 [https://perma.cc/49ZA-WC4G]; Lydia Saad, 
Trimesters Still Key to U.S. Abortion Views, GALLUP (June 13, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/
235469/trimesters-key-abortion-views.aspx [https://perma.cc/NAZ9-WACF]. 
13 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). 
14 See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text (providing an overview of D&X procedure). 
15 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 141 (citation omitted); see also id. at 159–60. 
16 See infra notes 87–91 and accompanying text (discussing the political success among the anti-
abortion activists on restricting access to D&X abortions). 
17 MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE V. WADE TO THE PRESENT 143–45 
(2020). 
18 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992). 
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women.19 The architects of the anti-abortion movement have always believed 
that they could “chang[e] hearts and minds” if they could convince the public 
that abortion harms women.20 
This Article describes how anti-abortion activists are once again using the 
woman-protective rationale to justify recent second-trimester abortion re-
strictions—bans on the D&E procedure, bans on abortions based on fetal 
anomaly, and requirements to inform women of perinatal hospice and pallia-
tive care (PHPC) programs after the diagnosis of fetal anomaly.21 Building on 
legal scholarship critical of the woman-protective rationale, this Article expos-
es the paternalism and gender stereotyping behind these more recent second-
trimester abortion restrictions.22 We also use studies of women’s abortion ex-
periences to debunk claims regarding abortion restrictions as a means to best 
protect women’s psychological health.23 
Despite the inaccuracies and sexist stereotyping inherent in the woman-
protective rationale, it remains intuitive to many—especially in the context of 
second-trimester abortion, when the uncomfortable realities of second-
trimester abortion seem to increase the alleged need to protect the woman. In 
Carhart, Justice Anthony Kennedy admitted he had no evidence to support his 
conclusions about women’s regret, yet he still concluded that women needed 
protection from a safe medical procedure.24 This intuition-based presumption 
is compounded by abortion precedent that gives state legislatures wide discre-
tion to consider “medical uncertainty” and reach a conclusion at odds with the 
medical establishment.25 As a result, evidence-based arguments refuting the 
woman-protective rationale may not be effective in court. 
We thus propose a new strategy for supporting second-trimester abortion 
rights—a radical reconceptualization of abortion dialogue in the United States. 
Our proposal builds on the pioneering work of abortion providers who intro-
duced the concept of “dangertalk” to describe open dialogue about uncomfort-
                                                                                                                           
19 See infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text (discussing the woman-protection rationale 
and its role in upholding laws that restrict abortion access). 
20 ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 145 (citation omitted). 
21 See infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text (discussing the woman-protection rationale 
and bans on certain abortion procedures). 
22 See infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning behind allowing 
abortion restrictions and the paternalism and gender-stereotyping inherent in the woman-protective 
rationale). 
23 See infra notes 271–397 and accompanying text (discussing relevant empirical studies that de-
bunk the woman-protective rationale). 
24 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007); see also Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Com-
mon Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 901 (2009). 
25 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 163; see also infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text (discussing the 
states that have passed abortion restriction laws with the reasoning that women need protection). 
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able abortion truths.26 Our Article introduces the concept of abortion danger-
talk to legal scholarship and expands its reach. In particular, we focus on two 
dangertalk subjects related to second-trimester abortion. First, we discuss the 
unique nature of the second-trimester abortion procedure, which is “visually 
and viscerally different” than first-trimester abortion because it involves “re-
moving what looks like a fully formed but small baby” instead of a “micro-
scopic fetus and gestational sac.”27 Second, we note that women can experi-
ence a broad range of emotional responses to abortion, especially later abor-
tions, including negative emotions, like grief. Canonical abortion rights dis-
course often avoids public discussion of these dangertalk subjects because of 
the fear that it could hurt the movement in litigation and the public narrative.28 
We argue that avoiding these truths does not protect abortion rights. To 
the contrary, the silence capitulates the narrative to the anti-abortion communi-
ty, which has exploited it to its own advantage. We suggest that the uncomfort-
able truths about second-trimester abortion should be met head on and dis-
cussed openly by the broader abortion rights movement. Though many abor-
tion providers discuss these topics in their daily practice, they remain hidden 
from the greater pro-choice discourse. Embracing abortion dangertalk should 
disarm the anti-abortion, woman-protective narrative surrounding second-
trimester abortion regulations—a narrative suggesting that women would not 
have chosen an abortion had they been better informed. We also argue that it 
will improve patient care. Greater openness on these topics will allow provid-
ers to more systemically offer patients options that could increase their auton-
omy and improve the abortion experience. Although these frank discussions 
come with risks, we think the benefits outweigh them. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores why women need second-
trimester abortion, contradicting common assumptions made about women 
who need this care.29 Part II describes recent popular second-trimester abortion 
laws: bans on the D&X and D&E procedures, bans that outlaw abortion based 
on certain, or all, fetal anomalies, and laws that mandate PHPC counseling.30 
Part III undercuts states’ claims that these laws benefit women and exposes the 
paternalism and gender stereotyping behind these restrictions.31 Part IV argues 
                                                                                                                           
26 See generally Lisa A. Martin et al., Dangertalk: Voices of Abortion Providers, 184 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 75 (2017) (providing an overview of the concept of dangertalk in the healthcare field). 
27 Lisa H. Harris, Second Trimester Abortion Provision: Breaking the Silence and Changing the 
Discourse, REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, Sept. 2008, at 74, 76. 
28 See Martin et al., supra note 26, at 80 (discussing healthcare providers’ and activists’ appre-
hension toward dangertalk because of the potential for anti-abortion advocates to negatively scrutinize 
it). 
 29 See infra notes 33–68 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 69–186 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 187–270 and accompanying text. 
2021] Second-Trimester Abortion Dangertalk 2151 
that embracing dangertalk will both rebut the woman-protective rationale and 
improve abortion care.32 
I. THE NEED FOR SECOND-TRIMESTER ABORTION 
A typical pregnancy lasts forty weeks and is divided into three tri-
mesters.33 Though one might assume the first week of pregnancy starts at con-
ception, doctors typically date pregnancies to start on the first day of a wom-
an’s last menstrual period. That means women are considered two weeks preg-
nant at conception, and are at least four weeks pregnant when a pregnancy test 
can first detect the pregnancy. The first trimester lasts the first thirteen weeks 
of pregnancy. The second trimester extends from fourteen weeks to twenty-
seven weeks of pregnancy. The third trimester starts at twenty-eight weeks and 
continues until birth, which usually occurs around forty weeks.  
Although the vast majority of abortions in the country occur during the 
first trimester, not all do. Using the most recent data from 2018, 92.2% of 
abortions were performed in the first trimester, 6.9% were performed at four-
teen to twenty weeks’ gestation (the first half of the second trimester), and 
1.0% were performed at twenty-one weeks or later (the second half of the sec-
ond trimester or later).34 Even though second-trimester abortions are rare, they 
are villainized. In 2021, only 34% of Americans said that abortion should be 
legal in most or all circumstances in the second trimester, compared to almost 
twice as many (61%), who said it should be legal in most or all circumstances 
in the first trimester.35 
A variety of reasons exist why women need abortions after the first tri-
mester.36 As one might expect, women who obtain second-trimester abortions 
often discover their pregnancies later than women who obtain first-trimester 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 271–397 and accompanying text. 
33 How Your Fetus Grows During Pregnancy: Frequently Asked Questions, AM. COLL. OBSTE-
TRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, https://www.acog.org/womens-health/faqs/how-your-fetus-grows-
during-pregnancy [https://perma.cc/6KQF-ZQVD]. 
34 Katherine Kortsmit et al., U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Abortion Surveillance—United 
States, 2018, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., 
Nov. 27, 2020, at 1, 6; see also Rachel K. Jones & Lawrence B. Finer, Who Has Second-Trimester 
Abortions in the United States?, 85 CONTRACEPTION 544, 544 (2012) (noting that only 9–10% of 
abortions occur in the second trimester); Evidence You Can Use: Later Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Nov. 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/later-abortion [https://perma.cc/
2WMW-DQE9] (discussing that roughly only 1% of abortions occur at or after twenty-one weeks). 
35 Crary & Fingerhut, supra note 12. This number was higher than a poll in 2018, which found 
that only 28% of Americans thought that abortion should be legal in the second trimester. Saad, supra 
note 12. 
36 See AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, PRACTICE BULL. NO. 135, SECOND TRI-
MESTER ABORTION, in 121 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1394, 1394 (2013) (describing the various 
circumstances that can lead to second-trimester abortion). 
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abortions.37 Historically, a pregnancy was confirmed at “quickening”—a 
woman’s first feeling of fetal movement—which does not occur until at least 
the second trimester.38 Today, however, there is a common societal view that 
women are “in tune” with their bodies, tracking their periods, and exercising 
control over their fertility, suggesting that women know—or at least should 
know—they are pregnant, even early on.39 Moreover, enhanced technology 
surrounding pregnancy detection, such as home pregnancy tests and ultra-
sounds, entrench the notion that women can, and should, detect their pregnan-
cy even earlier. As a result, women who fail to discover a pregnancy until after 
the first trimester are often perceived as irresponsible.40 
The normalization of early detection, however, is based on assumptions 
about early pregnancy that are not always true. It is important to note at the 
outset that nearly half of pregnancies in the United States are unintended.41 
When women are not trying to get pregnant, they are often not tracking their 
periods, making it harder to recognize if their menstrual cycle is late.42 Fur-
thermore, many women who become pregnant may have no symptoms, expe-
rience bleeding during the pregnancy that they mistake for their period, have 
irregular periods, or are using birth control when the pregnancy occurs, all of 
which mean the woman has no reason to suspect pregnancy.43 Obesity, lack of 
nausea and vomiting, and unawareness of last menstrual period also make it 
difficult to detect pregnancy and are significantly associated with delays in 
obtaining an abortion.44 For example, in a study of European women who had 
abortions after sixteen weeks of pregnancy, two-thirds of the participants did 
not learn of their pregnancy until after twelve weeks.45 “For some, this was 
because they were using contraception, had recently had a baby, had irregular 
                                                                                                                           
37 Diana G. Foster et al., Predictors of Delay in Each Step Leading to an Abortion, 77 CONTRA-
CEPTION 289, 290 (2008); see also Diana Greene Foster & Katrina Kimport, Who Seeks Abortions at 
or After 20 Weeks?, 45 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 210, 212–14 (2013) (explaining that 
women were also more likely to need an abortion after twenty weeks if they discovered their pregnan-
cy late (at twelve weeks, on average)). 
38 Carrie Purcell et al., Women’s Embodied Experiences of Second Trimester Medical Abortion, 
27 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 163, 167–68 (2017). 
39 Id. at 167. 
40 See id. at 172 (“Participants were acutely sensitive to how a later discovery of pregnancy might 
appear to others.”). 
41 See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2019), https://www.
guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states [https://perma.cc/P72B-W3D7] (noting 
that between 2001 and 2011, almost half of pregnancies in the United States were unplanned). 
 42 See Can You Be Pregnant and Not Know It?, CLEVELAND CLINIC (Nov. 7, 2019) https://
health.clevelandclinic.org/can-you-be-pregnant-and-not-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/629M-22PH] (ad-
vising that women track their cycles to be better aware of the possibility of pregnancy). 
43 Purcell et al., supra note 38, at 167. 
44 Foster et al., supra note 37, at 290, 292. 
45 Purcell et al., supra note 38, at 171. 
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periods, or were otherwise not expecting to be pregnant.”46 As a result, a first-
trimester abortion was almost immediately not an option. In addition, women 
with less education are more likely to discover a pregnancy late, likely due to a 
dearth of reproductive health education.47 
Once the pregnancy is discovered, women who terminate in the second 
trimester also frequently suffer other delays due to the lack of certainty about 
whether to terminate, difficulties saving money for the abortion, and long trav-
el distances (more than fifty miles) to an abortion facility.48 Women who need 
abortions after twenty weeks are more likely to live more than three hours from 
an abortion facility.49 For many, the logistical burdens imposed by long-distance 
travel, including public transportation, childcare, and time off work, can be 
daunting.50 Moreover, the second-trimester abortion procedure often takes two 
to three days, with many states also requiring waiting periods that add another 
day’s worth of travel, childcare, and expenses.51 And because second-trimester 
abortions are complex procedures, fewer providers offer to perform them, 
making access difficult for many women.52 Putting this all together, if a wom-
an does not discover her pregnancy until months after it begins, and then needs 
weeks or more to decide whether she wants to terminate, save the necessary 
money for the procedure, or plan the logistics associated with long travel, she 
will inevitably need a second-trimester abortion. 
Some second-trimester abortions also occur in intended pregnancies. For 
instance, women who make the initial choice to continue their pregnancy, may 
decide to terminate later when faced with a disruptive life event, such as end-
ing a relationship or losing employment.53 A woman may also learn of a ma-
ternal or fetal health condition that forces her to consider abortion in a preg-
nancy she intended. A study of abortion patients published in 2012 noted that 
only a small cohort of participants stated their pregnancies were planned, but 
those women were more likely to seek a second-trimester abortion.54 And more 
than half of women who had an abortion in an intended pregnancy did so after 
sixteen weeks.55 
                                                                                                                           
46 Id. 
47 Jones & Finer, supra note 34, at 549. 
48 Foster et al., supra note 37, at 289–90; Evidence You Can Use: Later Abortion, supra note 34. 
 49 Foster & Kimport, supra note 37, at 212. 
50 Id. at 212–15. 
51 Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Denial of Abortion Because of Provider Gestational Age Limits in 
the United States, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1687, 1687 (2014). 
52 Id. 
53 Jones & Finer, supra note 34, at 549; see also Purcell et al., supra note 38, at 173 (explaining 
the “common experience” of a partnership ending as motivation for a woman to seek second-trimester 
abortion). 
54 Jones & Finer, supra note 34, at 549. 
55 Id. at 547–49. 
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In the case of fetal anomaly, almost always, the fetal diagnosis will occur 
in the second or even the third trimester.56 Though late first-trimester screening 
tests exist, the screening tests are not diagnostic, and require additional testing 
in the second trimester for confirmation.57 Furthermore, many non-genetic 
conditions cannot be diagnosed until an anatomy scan is conducted, which oc-
curs around twenty weeks.58 Currently, in the United States, most women who 
receive a life-threatening fetal diagnosis choose to terminate. Roughly 80–90% 
of parents chose to terminate after learning of a fatal fetal diagnosis and 60–
75% of parents chose to terminate for other life-threatening fetal diagnoses.59 
Fetal anomalies, however, are relatively rare and not all women seek testing. 
As a result, only about 14% of women who obtained an abortion did so be-
cause of fetal health issues.60 
Alternatively, a woman may discover an issue with her own health that 
forces her to consider termination in the second trimester with an intended 
pregnancy.61 For instance, she might be diagnosed with cancer, the treatment 
for which should not be delayed, but could be toxic to the fetus.62 A woman’s 
water could also break, or the placenta could partially detach, prior to viability, 
a time when the baby is unlikely to survive outside of the womb.63 Either sce-
nario could expose the pregnant woman to infection, hemorrhage, or other 
risks.64 A pregnancy could also exacerbate other pre-existing health conditions 
that threaten a woman’s health before the fetus is viable.65 In these instances, a 
woman may be in the unexpected position of considering termination. 
Age, race, and class are highly associated with a woman seeking a sec-
ond-trimester abortion. Women are more likely to need a second-trimester 
abortion if they are adolescents, lack a high school degree, or rely on health 
                                                                                                                           
56 Greer Donley, Parental Autonomy Over Prenatal End-of-Life Decisions, 105 MINN. L. REV. 
175, 218–20 (2020). 
 57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 184–85, 188. 
60 Greer Donley, Note, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal Anomaly?: Exam-
ining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of Prenatal Whole Genome Se-
quencing, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 296 (2013). 
61 Elizabeth Czukas, Therapeutic Termination of a Pregnancy, VERYWELL FAM. (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://www.verywellfamily.com/reasons-for-therapeutic-termination-2371295 [https://perma.cc/NZP4-
HMGC]. 
62 Min Hee Shim et al., Clinical Characteristics and Outcome of Cancer Diagnosed During 
Pregnancy, 59 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY SCI. 1, 6 (2016). 
63 See Donley, supra note 56, at 217–18 (discussing the time of viability as beginning around 
twenty-four weeks of pregnancy). 
64 Id. at 186. 
65 Abortion Can Be Medically Necessary, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Sept. 
25, 2019), https://www.acog.org/news/news-releases/2019/09/abortion-can-be-medically-necessary 
[https://perma.cc/79AY-ERX4]. 
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insurance to pay for the abortion.66 A 2012 study also concluded that Black 
women, women with less education, and “those who had experienced three or 
more disruptive events in the last year” were more likely to have an abortion at 
thirteen weeks of pregnancy or later.67 As a result, additional restrictions on 
second-trimester abortion will disproportionately affect poor women, women 
of color, and young women. 
Despite the myriad reasons that women need second-trimester abortions, 
anti-abortion activists have targeted these abortions for regulation as part of 
their broader agenda to end abortion. In the Part below, we describe some of 
the most common second-trimester abortion laws that have surfaced in the last 
few decades.68 We later link them to the larger anti-abortion strategy of defend-
ing abortion laws by claiming they are necessary to protect women. 
II. TARGETING SECOND-TRIMESTER ABORTION 
Although women need and have second-trimester abortions, public ac-
ceptance of abortion drops significantly after the first trimester. More than 
60% of Americans support abortion in most or all cases in the first trimester, 
but only 34% felt the same in the second trimester.69 
All abortion restrictions, from waiting periods to mandatory counseling, 
affect second-trimester abortion, but a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion in 
the second trimester is specifically limited in a variety of ways. Under both 
Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
the state can legally prohibit abortion only after viability—the point at which 
the fetus could likely survive outside of the womb.70 Because fetuses grow at 
slightly different rates, the determination of viability requires a case-by-case 
analysis of each fetus, but usually occurs around twenty-four weeks of preg-
nancy.71 Thus, states are free to prohibit late second-trimester abortion, and the 
vast majority prohibit abortion at this point or earlier. Twenty states ban abor-
tion at “viability,” and four states ban abortion at twenty-four weeks.72 Many 
                                                                                                                           
66 Jones & Finer, supra note 34, at 546. 
67 Id. at 544. The study defined disruptive life events as “falling behind on rent or mortgage, un-
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having a serious medical problem, having a friend or family member with a serious medical problem, 
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at 546. 
 68 See infra notes 69–186 and accompanying text (discussing the recent restrictions on abortion 
access). 
69 Crary & Fingerhut, supra note 12. 
70 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973), holding modified by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
71 Donley, supra note 56, at 217–18. 
72 Id. 
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other states ban abortion earlier in the second trimester—arguably before via-
bility. For example, sixteen states currently ban abortion at twenty-two weeks 
and one state has an active twenty-week ban.73 Since May 2019, after Justice 
Kennedy retired, conservative states have tried to ban abortion even earlier in 
the pregnancy––from conception to eighteen weeks. Some lower courts have 
held that laws banning abortion between fifteen and twenty-two weeks are un-
constitutional, but not all.74 
In May 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case involving 
Mississippi’s fifteen-week abortion ban, agreeing to hear argument on 
“[w]hether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitu-
tional.”75 This question involves a direct challenge to the central holding from 
Roe and Casey—that the state cannot prohibit any woman from obtaining an 
abortion before viability.76 Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Dobbs 
foreshadows a Supreme Court willing to dive into the abortion controversy and 
reshape abortion rights jurisprudence. And if the Court holds, as is expected, 
that pre-viability abortion restrictions can be constitutional, the contours of that 
holding will likely be fleshed out most immediately in cases involving the sec-
ond-trimester abortion law restrictions discussed in this Article. In particular, 
recent en banc circuit decisions upholding Texas’s D&E abortion ban and 
                                                                                                                           
73 State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.
org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions [https://perma.cc/39W6-UREN] (Sept. 1, 2021). 
74 See Donley, supra note 56, at 221 (discussing examples of some states, such as Arizona, North 
Carolina, and Utah, that attempted to ban abortion early in the second trimester). 
75 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th 
Cir. 2019) (No. 19-1392), cert. granted in part, No. 19-1392 (U.S. May 17, 2021). 
76 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 (1992). All 
of the lower courts that have considered the issue have held these pre-viability abortion laws unconsti-
tutional. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in part, 
No. 19-1392 (U.S. May 17, 2021); SisterSong Women of Color Reprod. Just. Collective v. Kemp, 472 
F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2020), appeal filed sub nom., SisterSong Women of Color Reprod. 
v. Governor of Ga., No. 20-13024 (11th Cir. Aug. 18, 2021); Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned 
Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc., v. Parson, 389 F. Supp. 3d 631, 630 (W.D. Mo.), modified, 408 
F. Supp. 3d 1049 (W.D. Mo. 2019), aff’d, 1 F.4th 552 (8th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. docketed sub 
nom., Schmitt v. Reprod. Health Servs. Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc., No. 21-3 (U.S. 
July 2, 2021), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood 
of St. Louis Region, Inc., v. Parson, No. 19-2882 (8th Cir. July 13, 2021); Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 
394 F. Supp. 3d 796, 804 (S.D. Ohio 2019). After the petitioners in Parson filed their appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit then granted a rehearing of the case en banc and vacated its previ-
ous decision. See Parson, No. 19-2882 (8th Cir. July 13, 2021). In response, the respondents filed a 
letter to the Supreme Court requesting guidance for how to proceed with the pending petition for cer-
tiorari before the Court, given the Eighth Circuit’s latest disposition. See Letter from Claudia Ham-
merman, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, to Scott Harris, Clerk, Supreme 
Court of the United States (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-3/
187765/20210817172356323_20210817-172021-95754469-00000148.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B8S-
QMG8]. 
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Ohio’s Down Syndrome abortion ban—both of which created a circuit split—
are perfectly teed up for the Supreme Court to consider next term.77 
This Article focuses on restrictions based on “how” the doctor would per-
form the second-trimester abortion and “why” the woman sought the second-
trimester abortion. More specifically, we focus on laws that ban D&E and 
D&X surgical procedures and abortion restrictions related to fetal anomaly. 
These restrictions are part of the long-term, anti-abortion strategy of slowly 
chipping away at abortion rights over time. By drawing attention to more con-
troversial abortions, the hope is to degrade support for abortion rights general-
ly. Courts analyze the constitutionality of all abortion laws, included the ones 
we highlight below, under the undue burden test from Casey, which asks 
whether the law places “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”78 The Sections to follow in this 
Part discuss restrictions on various abortion procedures, how they fit into the 
anti-abortion strategy, and the status of litigation concerning them. Section A 
provides an overview of restrictions on D&X procedures.79 Section B de-
scribes similar efforts related to the D&E procedure.80 Section C discusses dis-
ability-selective abortion bans.81 Last, Section D explores mandates on coun-
seling for women after receiving a fetal diagnosis.82 
A. D&X Bans 
One of the most successful anti-abortion campaigns over the past quarter 
century was the movement to ban a second-trimester abortion procedure called 
D&X.83 This procedure allowed physicians to remove the fetus whole, making 
fewer passes through a woman’s cervix with instruments that could potentially 
damage the uterus, and therefore reduce risks. To allow the fetus to be re-
moved whole, the D&X involves partially delivering the fetus in a breech (feet 
first) position, and emptying the contents of the skull, so that it can collapse 
and safely pass through the cervix.84 Typically, the fetus would die during the 
procedure, but fetal demise could also be initiated beforehand with either an 
                                                                                                                           
77 Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, No. 17-51060, 2021 WL 3661318 (5th Cir. 2021); Preterm-
Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512, 535 (6th Cir. 2021). 
78 505 U.S. at 878. 
 79 See infra notes 83–104 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 105–131 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 132–157 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 158–186 and accompanying text. 
83 See ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 152 (describing the D&X campaign as a “political godsend” for 
leading anti-abortion groups). 
84 Id. at 150, 152; Rigel C. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Political and Moral Battle Over Late-
Term Abortion, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 397, 403 (1998). 
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injection or by cutting the umbilical cord.85 The D&X procedure was used not 
only in abortion, but also for miscarriage or stillbirth management in the sec-
ond or third trimester.86 The only difference in these situations is that the fetus 
would have died on its own before the D&X began. 
Anti-abortion activists dubbed this procedure “partial-birth abortion”—a 
non-medical term that stuck and even made it into subsequent legislation.87 
This term had a large impact in framing the debate—it allowed opponents of 
the D&X procedure to make comparisons to infanticide and “draw upon the 
powerful mental images and emotions evoked by birth.”88 The term incorrectly 
suggested that D&X procedures were performed on healthy, full-term babies, 
when in reality, the vast majority of D&X abortions occurred before viability.89 
In large part because of this framing, not only did the anti-abortion movement 
succeed in gaining a nationwide D&X ban, which was upheld by the Supreme 
Court, but it also dramatically influenced public opinion.90 Within a few years, 
Americans supporting legal abortions “under all circumstances” fell by nearly 
a third, from about 34% to only 22%.91 
The abortion rights community did not initially anticipate the controversy 
surrounding the D&X procedure because it was new and rarely used.92 But 
once state and federal bans were enacted, the predominant strategy to oppose 
them was to focus on their lack of a health exception.93 It became a tactical 
decision to focus entirely on a small subset of women who had a D&X abor-
tion: women who terminated after learning of a severe fetal diagnosis.94 There 
were some advantages to focusing on these cases—the women were relatable 
                                                                                                                           
85 SOC’Y FAM. PLAN., CLINICAL GUIDELINE 20101, INDUCTION OF FETAL DEMISE BEFORE 
ABORTION, in 81 CONTRACEPTION 462, 463 (2010). 
86 See Gabriela Weigel et al., Understanding Pregnancy Loss in the Context of Abortion Re-
strictions and Fetal Harm Laws, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.kff.org/womens-
health-policy/issue-brief/understanding-pregnancy-loss-in-the-context-of-abortion-restrictions-and-
fetal-harm-laws/ [https://perma.cc/57R6-7YHF] (“D&X can be used in abortion but also in stillbirth 
management if the intact stillborn is desired by the family for personal reasons (religious, burial cere-
mony, etc.) or medical reasons to assess cause of death.”). In the United States, pregnancy loss before 
twenty weeks is called miscarriage, and loss after twenty weeks is called stillbirth. About Stillbirth, 
STAR LEGACY FOUND., https://starlegacyfoundation.org/about-stillbirth/ [https://perma.cc/47QU-
JT3Y]. 
87 Oliveri, supra note 84, at 406–07; SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, WHO LIVES, WHO DIES, WHO 
DECIDES?: ABORTION, ASSISTED DYING, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AND TORTURE 181 (Jodi O’Brien & 
Marcus Hunter eds., 3d ed. 2018). 
 88 Oliveri, supra note 84, at 407. 
89 Id. 
90 See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
91 See ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 156 (discussing the ruling’s effect on public opinion). 
92 Id. at 152. 
93 Oliveri, supra note 84, at 413. 
94 ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 161; Oliveri, supra note 84, at 414. 
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to those in positions of power as they were often white, educated, married, al-
ready mothers, and carrying wanted pregnancies.95 This strategy was effective 
early on in the debates, and even led to President Bill Clinton vetoing two bills 
because they lacked a health exception. But the strategy later backfired when 
the public learned that the majority of D&X abortions occurred outside of this 
context—meaning most women who received a D&X were not doing so be-
cause of a fetal anomaly. Critics have also suggested that this tactic of focusing 
on fetal anomaly abortions reinforced notions of the “good” abortion and vil-
lainized women who obtained a D&X due to other reasons.96 
Soon after President George W. Bush was inaugurated, he signed into law 
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act, which lacked a health exception.97 
Abortion rights activists were optimistic that the Supreme Court would invali-
date the law—after all, the Court had recently invalidated a nearly identical 
state law in 2000, albeit by a 5–4 margin.98 But by the time the federal law 
reached the Supreme Court in 2007, President George Bush had nominated 
two new members to the Court, including, most importantly, the replacement 
of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with Justice Samuel Alito. The anti-abortion 
community had recently started incorporating arguments that women who had 
abortions regretted their choice, including amicus briefs from regretful women, 
which became a part of the legal strategy defending the D&X ban.99 In Gonza-
les v. Carhart, the Court upheld the federal ban, distinguishing its previous 
decision on narrow grounds with a 5–4 majority that included Justice Alito.100 
The federal D&X ban is still on the books today and many states also 
have passed their own D&X bans, using similar language.101 Notably, the fed-
eral ban only applies when the D&X is performed on a viable fetus.102 As a 
result, providers could continue to perform D&X abortions if they induced fe-
tal demise beforehand, although the law caused a chilling effect that makes any 
D&X procedure essentially non-existent.103 The D&X ban still left women 
with the ability to obtain abortions, just with a procedure other than the D&X. 
Not all anti-abortion activists were happy with this litigation strategy, which 
                                                                                                                           
95 Oliveri, supra note 84, at 420, 430. 
96 Id. at 424, 430. 
97 18 U.S.C. § 1531. 
98 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000). 
 99 ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 173–75. 
100 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007); see ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 177 (discussing 
the addition of Justice Alito to the Supreme Court and its effect on anti-abortion case rulings). 
101 Bans on Specific Abortion Methods Used After the First Trimester, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 
1, 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/bans-specific-abortion-methods-used-after-
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102 18 U.S.C. § 1531. 
103 EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 87, at 199. 
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devoted enormous resources to passing and defending a law that did not pre-
vent any abortions.104 The campaign was nevertheless successful at shifting the 
abortion debate to the right by focusing public attention on the uncomfortable 
details of an abortion procedure. 
B. D&E Bans 
Given the success of D&X bans, anti-abortion legislatures have recently 
passed state laws that ban the most common type of abortion procedure in the 
second trimester: D&E. Unlike a D&X procedure, a D&E abortion does not 
remove the fetus whole, but instead requires the provider to make multiple 
passes into the uterus with instruments to remove the fetus in parts.105 The 
woman’s cervix is typically dilated over the course of hours or days before the 
procedure.106 The D&E is also used for management of second-trimester mis-
carriage and some early stillbirths.107 Like the federal D&X ban, state D&E 
bans usually apply only to D&Es performed without fetal demise beforehand. 
Eleven states have tried to ban D&E abortions, but the ban is only active 
in two jurisdictions: Mississippi and West Virginia.108 Litigation is ongoing in 
many more states. It is clear that anti-abortion groups are pursuing the same 
strategy that was effective in banning the D&X. “Taking a page out of the 
playbook of the successful ‘partial birth’ campaign, anti-abortion opponents 
have given a grotesque-sounding nonmedical name to” the D&E: dismember-
ment abortions.109 Though only 6.9% of U.S. abortions occur after the first 
trimester, roughly 95% of them are completed with a D&E.110 If this method 
were banned, abortion providers would be left with only two remaining op-
                                                                                                                           
104 See ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 175 (explaining anti-abortion activists’ frustration with “in-
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105 Oliveri, supra note 84, at 445. 
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107 See Torri D. Metz et al., Management of Stillbirth, in OBSTETRIC CARE CONSENSUS 2020, at 
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10, 2020), https://www.acog.org/-/media/project/acog/acogorg/clinical/files/obstetric-care-consensus/
articles/2020/03/management-of-stillbirth.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7PG-BMXH] (explaining that D&E 
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110 Donovan, supra note 109, at 35; Kortsmit et al., supra note 34. 
2021] Second-Trimester Abortion Dangertalk 2161 
tions for second-trimester abortion: abortion through labor and delivery (induc-
tion abortion) or inducing fetal demise before a D&E or D&X.111 
The first option, induction abortion, is neither popular nor widely availa-
ble.112 As the name suggests, induction abortion requires a woman to labor and 
give birth. It typically takes days of induced labor before the fetus will be de-
livered, and in one-third of cases, the woman will still need surgery to remove 
the placenta.113 As a result, induction abortions are more time-consuming, in-
vasive, painful, and expensive than D&E abortions.114 But perhaps most im-
portantly, they are also more dangerous: 30–43% of women who had induction 
abortions experienced complications, compared to only 5–10% of women who 
had D&Es.115 Induction abortions are also less accessible because only a hand-
ful of clinics offer them; otherwise, they must be performed in a hospital.116 
Eleven states go so far as to ban abortions in public hospitals.117 Even in states 
where hospital abortions are allowed, most do not provide abortions—either 
for practical considerations or moral objections—and the cost can be prohibi-
tive for most women.118 
The other option requires a provider to induce fetal demise prior to the 
abortion. Fetal demise can be initiated by injecting the fetus with a medication 
that stops its heart (either through the woman’s abdomen or cervix) or by tying 
the umbilical cord, thus cutting off the fetus’s oxygen source, before the 
D&E.119 The former adds an unnecessary procedure that creates additional pa-
tient risks, including infection, cardiac arrest, and hemorrhage in the wom-
an.120 This procedure also increases the cost, time, and pain associated with the 
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1310, 1324 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting the risks associated with the procedures used to cause fetal de-
mise), cert. denied sub nom., Harris v. W. Ala. Women’s Ctr., 139 S. Ct. 2606 (2019); Blair 
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abortion.121 Though the latter can often be completed at the beginning of the 
abortion procedure, making it a cost-free and less invasive alternative to initi-
ate fetal demise, it is not always technically possible because fetal position can 
make it impossible for the physician to reach the umbilical cord.122 
The Supreme Court will likely determine the constitutionality of a D&E 
ban in the near future.123 Abortion rights activists have argued that these laws 
must be unconstitutional because they ban the procedure used for 95% of sec-
ond-trimester abortions—in their view, effectively banning pre-viability, sec-
ond-trimester abortions altogether in express contravention to Roe and Ca-
sey.124 There is support for this argument in the reasoning of the Carhart opin-
ion, where the Court held that states may ban the D&X precisely because 
women would still have access to second-trimester, pre-viability abortions us-
ing a D&E.125 
States have responded that this extra requirement does not actually ban 
these abortions, as it only requires the additional step of inducing fetal demise. 
Therefore, it is no different than laws that mandate waiting periods after con-
sent or an ultrasound prior to an abortion.126 Under this argument, the same 
reasoning from Carhart applies—women are not prevented from obtaining a 
pre-viability, second-trimester abortion if they can either have an induction 
abortion or a D&E with fetal demise. Thus far, courts have not accepted that 
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also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate 
interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.”), holding modified by Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992). 
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argument. Instead courts have held that “fetal demise methods—their attendant 
risks; their technical difficulty; their untested nature; the time and cost associ-
ated with performing them; the lack of training opportunities; and the inability 
to recruit experienced practitioners to perform them” create an undue burden, 
and are therefore unconstitutional.127 And abortion providers are quick to note 
that these laws create a slippery slope to more impactful abortion regulations 
in the future, like bans on drugs that induce fetal death, which would then 
force women into induction abortions.128 
In late summer 2021, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
found Texas’s D&E ban constitutional. 129 This decision creates a circuit split 
with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’s prior finding that Kentucky’s D&E 
ban was unconstitutional,130 inviting the Supreme Court’s intervention. Also, if 
the Court opens the door to pre-viability abortion bans in Dobbs, the predomi-
nate argument against D&E bans—that they prohibit pre-viability abortions—
will fall apart.131 
C. Disability-Selective Abortion Bans 
Anti-abortion state legislatures are also targeting the reasons women 
choose second-trimester abortions. Over the past decade, sixteen states have 
passed laws aimed at banning abortions that are based on the “sex, race, or dis-
ability of the fetus.”132 These laws have been referred to as “reasons-based 
abortion bans” as they ban all abortions that are performed for a particular rea-
son.133 The most successful of the reasons-based abortion bans have been those 
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132 Carole J. Petersen, Reproductive Autonomy and Laws Prohibiting “Discriminatory” Abor-
tions: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 96 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 605, 606 (2019); see Abor-
tion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.
guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-sex-or-race-selection-or-genetic-anomaly 
[https://perma.cc/AXX8-969Z] (Sept. 1, 2021) (providing an overview of state abortion bans that 
restrict “specific pregnancy conditions and populations”). 
133 See Donley, supra note 60, at 326, 326–27 (discussing whether the state or federal government 
has the authority to ban abortions due to the fetus’s genetic abnormality); see also Petersen, supra 
note 132, at 606, 618–19 (discussing the ethical and constitutional considerations regarding state laws 
that ban abortion because of “sex, race, or disability of the fetus”); Marc Spindelman, On the Consti-
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that are based on a fetal disability. Because fetal anomalies are almost always 
diagnosed after the first trimester, these bans almost exclusively impact sec-
ond-trimester abortion care.134 These laws can have intuitive appeal as anti-
discrimination laws, and some notable judges and justices—including Judge 
Frank Easterbrook, Justice Barrett, and Justice Clarence Thomas—have ex-
pressed support for them on that basis.135 Given the complex history between 
the abortion rights and disability rights communities, abortion rights advocates 
are in a difficult position as they consider how to best object to abortion bans 
based on fetal anomaly.136 
A range of fetal diagnoses may prompt a woman to consider termination. 
Many disability-restrictive abortion bans focus on Trisomy 21 (colloquially 
known as Down Syndrome) or include a range of anomalies, but often exclud-
ing those identified as fatal.137 But the oldest of these laws—from North Dako-
ta—is very broad and could be interpreted to include all fetal anomalies, in-
cluding the most fatal conditions.138 These very serious anomalies can be both 
genetic (for instance, Trisomy 13 or 18) or structural (for instance, anenceph-
aly or bilateral renal agenesis), though many more exist that are also (slightly 
less) life-threatening.139 These conditions almost always result in stillbirth or 
infant mortality, and no child with them has survived to adulthood. 
Abortion bans specifically aimed at fetal anomaly are not the only way in 
which states ban these abortions. An early week-based ban that lacks an excep-
tion for abortions based on fetal anomaly will, in effect, also ban many of these 
abortions, which almost always occur in the second trimester.140 Though wom-
en are often screened for certain genetic conditions—such as Trisomy 13, 18, 
and 21—late in their first trimester, those tests are not diagnostic, and the re-
sults from the diagnostic test will almost always be received after fourteen 
                                                                                                                           
tutionality of Ohio’s “Down Syndrome Abortion Ban,” 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 32–33 (2018) (examining 
a state’s ban on abortion due to the fetus’s Down Syndrome diagnosis). 
134 Donley, supra note 56, at 218. 
135 See, e.g., Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1792 (2019) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (per curiam) (“In other contexts, the Court has been zealous in vindicating 
the rights of people even potentially subjected to race, sex, and disability discrimination.”); Planned 
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 917 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 
2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“Using abortion to promote eugenic goals is morally and pruden-
tially debatable on grounds different from those that underlay the statutes Casey considered.”). 
136 Mary Ziegler, The Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 587, 626–27, https://
dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=ulr [https://perma.cc/X5T4-UXDE]. 
137 See Donley, supra note 56, at 181–91, 222–26 (providing overview of disability-selective 
abortions bands and describing fetal anomalies as ranging from minor disability to fatal conditions). 
138 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1) (West 2021) (first enacted in 2014); see also Don-
ley, supra note 56, at 183 (discussing the most severe types of fetal anomalies, often called “fatal” or 
“lethal” and labeled as “being incompatible with life”). 
139 Donley, supra note 56, at 181–91. 
140 Id. at 217–19. 
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weeks. Non-genetic fetal anomalies are typically not diagnosed until the anat-
omy ultrasound around twenty weeks. 
Current week-based bans already make it difficult—if not impossible—
for some women to obtain an abortion after learning of a fetal anomaly. And as 
state legislatures have tried to move the week-based bans earlier, they have 
explicitly found it acceptable that the ban prevents women from terminating 
even in the face of a life-limiting fetal anomaly.141 For example, in Missouri’s 
eight-week ban, anti-abortion advocates have specifically defended the lack of 
an exception for life-limiting fetal conditions.142 Arkansas’s ban also lacks 
such an exception, with one state legislator noting that the woman should con-
tinue the pregnancy to enable organ donation—despite its impossibility after 
stillbirth.143 No court has explicitly considered the constitutionality of a tim-
ing-based ban that did not create an exception for fetal anomalies.144 
Before 2021, all courts to consider disability-selective abortion laws held 
them unconstitutional under Casey,145 which held that a state cannot outright 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. 
142 See MO. ANN. REV. STAT. § 188.056 (West 2021) (having been preliminarily enjoined by Re-
prod. Health Servs. Planned Parenthood St. Louis Region, Inc., v. Parson, 389 F. Supp. 3d 631, 630 
(W.D. Mo. 2019), modified, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (W.D. Mo. 2019), aff’d, 1 F.4th 552 (8th Cir. 
2021), petition for cert. docketed sub nom., Schmitt v. Reprod. Health Servs. Planned Parenthood of 
St. Louis Region, Inc., No. 21-3 (U.S. July 2, 2021), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, Reprod. 
Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc., v. Parson, No. 19-2882 (8th Cir. July 
13, 2021)). 
143 Rachel Herzog, House OKs Abortion Ban, ARK. DEM.-GAZETTE (Mar. 4. 2021), https://www.
arkansasonline.com/news/2021/mar/04/house-oks-abortion-ban/ [https://perma.cc/K2UB-4WZK]; see 
also infra notes 239–240 and accompanying text (discussing some states’ invocation of the woman-
protective rationale in prohibiting abortions based on fatal fetal prenatal diagnoses). 
144 Though the issue was raised before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court did not ad-
dress it; instead, it held the abortion ban unconstitutional because it banned pre-viability abortions. 
Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v. 
Rutledge, 398 F. Supp. 3d 330, 335 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (enjoining enforcement of Arkansas’s eighteen-
week abortion ban). For additional background on the issue and arguments raised before the Ninth 
Circuit, see generally Brief Amici Curiae of Andrew M. Tobin, Speaker of the Ariz. House of Repre-
sentatives & Steve Pierce, President of the Ariz. Senate Supporting Appellees & Affirmance, Isaacson v. 
Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-16670) and Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Coll. Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists & Am. Cong. Obstetricians & Gynecologists in Support Plaintiffs-Appellants & 
Reversal, Isaacson, 716 F.3d 1213 (No. 12-16670). For an analysis of why an exception for fetal anoma-
ly might be constitutionally required even if Roe and Casey are limited or overturned, see Donley, 
supra note 56. 
145 See Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 755 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (“The State can-
not dictate what factors a woman is permitted to consider in making her choice. The State’s attempt to 
carve out exceptions to a categorical right [to pre-viability abortions] where none exist fails as a mat-
ter of law.”), rev’d sub nom., Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2021); see also 
Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs., 398 F. Supp. 3d at 384 (“[T]he State may not prohibit a woman from 
exercising that right solely upon the basis on which a woman makes her decision.” (citation omitted)); 
Reprod. Health Servs. Planned Parenthood St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Parson, 389 F. Supp. 3d 631, 635 
(W.D. Mo.) (noting that the State cannot prohibit a woman’s right to obtain an abortion prior to viabil-
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prevent any woman from obtaining a pre-viability abortion.146 The courts rea-
soned that disability-selective abortion bans would, by definition, prevent 
some women from receiving a pre-viability abortion—those terminating on the 
basis of a prenatal diagnosis.147 But the tide is changing. In 2019, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari on a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case, which in-
validated, as unconstitutional, a law in Indiana that banned abortions based on 
fetal diagnoses, such as Down Syndrome and other disabilities, but excluded 
“lethal fetal anomal[ies].”148 The Court specifically noted that it was following 
tradition by not granting petitions for those that introduce legal questions that 
other lower courts have not yet considered.149 Some lower courts have inter-
preted the Supreme Court’s language as inviting a circuit split to consider the 
issue more fully,150 especially in light of Justice Thomas’s fiery dissent in 
which he expressed his view that the law may be constitutional.151 He reasoned 
that the law could be necessary to prevent disability discrimination.152 Judges 
Barrett and Easterbrook, who heard the case before the Seventh Circuit in 
2018, espoused similar views in their dissent.153 
In April 2021, in Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, the Sixth Circuit, sitting 
en banc, held that Ohio’s Down Syndrome abortion ban was constitutional.154 
It reasoned, oddly, that the law would not actually ban these abortions because 
                                                                                                                           
ity), modified, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (W.D. Mo. 2019), aff’d, 1 F.4th 552 (8th Cir. 2021), petition for 
cert. docketed sub nom., Schmitt v. Reprod. Health Servs. Planned Parenthood St. Louis Region, Inc., 
No. 21-3 (U.S. July 2, 2021), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, Reprod. Health Servs. of 
Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc., v. Parson, No. 19-2882 (8th Cir. July 13, 2021). 
146 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) 
(“Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion 
. . . .”). 
147 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving pre-viability abortion 
bans). 
148 IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-4-1(b) (West 2021). 
149 Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019) (per curiam). 
150 See Parson, 389 F. Supp. 3d at 636 (“While it can be speculated that the Supreme Court’s lan-
guage in Box implicitly invited appellate judges to review the merits of prohibitions of discriminatory 
abortions, any such invitation was not addressed to district judges.”). 
 151 See Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1783–93 (Thomas, J., concurring) (per curiam). 
152 See id. at 1792 (“Enshrining a constitutional right to an abortion based solely on the race, sex, 
or disability of an unborn child, as Planned Parenthood advocates, would constitutionalize the views 
of the 20th-century eugenics movement.”). 
153 See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 917 F.3d 
532, 536 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (describing the Indiana law at issue—which 
attempted to make illegal abortions performed for reasons, such as sex, race, or disability—as a “eu-
genics statute”). 
154 994 F.3d 512, 535 (6th Cir. 2021). The Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio law was not a ban on 
abortions based on Down Syndrome. Id. Shortly before this decision, the Sixth Circuit panel had also 
allowed Tennessee’s law banning abortions on the basis of Down Syndrome to go into effect pending 
the appeal of a district court’s preliminary injunction preventing enforcement. Memphis Ctr. for Re-
prod. Health v. Slatery, No. 20-5969, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 36780 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 20, 2020). 
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the law required the abortion provider to have actual knowledge that the abor-
tion was due to a Down Syndrome diagnosis, and that women are not required 
to tell their doctors about their motivation for the abortion, nor should doctors 
assume that a diagnosed fetal anomaly is the reason for an abortion.155 Com-
mentators have suggested that this opinion reinterprets the Ohio law as a 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy for abortion care.156 This opinion created the in-
vited circuit split, teeing the case up for Supreme Court review. Like with the 
D&E bans, if the Court finds in Dobbs that some pre-viability abortion bans 
are constitutional, disability selective abortion bans may also become constitu-
tionally permissible.157 
D. Mandatory Counseling After Fetal Diagnosis 
Congress and the states have also passed laws mandating that healthcare 
providers give pregnant patients information on fetal diagnoses. Some of these 
laws are seemingly unrelated to abortion, mandating disclosure of information 
at the time of diagnosis. One example is the Prenatally and Postnatally Diag-
nosed Conditions Act, passed with bipartisan support and signed by President 
Bush in 2008.158 One purpose of the law is to disclose the latest information on 
the potential health effects associated with a prenatal diagnosis, including the 
range of “physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial outcomes.”159 
Numerous states representing both political leanings have also passed similar 
laws in order to help parents make informed decisions.160 Though these laws 
are far from perfect, they can help ensure that parents have access to the best 
possible information on the fetal diagnosis. Importantly, they are not tied to 
abortion regulations in any discernable way and do not encourage any outcome. 
Other state laws, however, do not mandate disclosure until the woman, 
having already decided to terminate, appears at the clinic desiring an abor-
tion—tying the provision of information to abortion access. For instance, Wis-
consin law mandates that if the unborn child has been diagnosed with a disabil-
ity, the woman must be provided printed materials with information on “com-
                                                                                                                           
155 McCloud, 994 F.3d at 533. 
156 Debra Cassens Weiss, Full 6th Circuit Upholds ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Law Punishing Docs 
Who Perform Down Syndrome Abortions, ABA J. (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/full-6th-circuit-upholds-dont-ask-dont-tell-law-punishing-docs-who-knowingly-perform-down-
syndrome-abortions [https://perma.cc/7DTS-JN6Q]. 
157 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in part, 
No. 19-1392, 2021 WL 1951792 (U.S. 2021). 
158 Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 
Stat. 4051 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8). 
159 Id. at § 2(1)–(3). 
160 See Bret D. Asbury, Fostering Informed Choice: Alleviating the Trauma of Genetic Abortions, 
25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 315–16 (2015). 
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munity-based services,” financial assistance programs, and support groups for 
parents of children with disabilities, in addition to information on adoption of 
children with special needs.161 Unlike mandated disclosure at the time of diag-
nosis, these laws make disclosure and receipt of this information prerequisites 
to obtaining an abortion. The disclosure will occur when the woman—who has 
already decided to terminate—visits the clinic to obtain an abortion.162 
An increasingly popular example of tying the provision of information to 
abortion access is state laws mandating disclosure to a woman about PHPC “as 
an alternative to abortion” before she can obtain an abortion.163 PHPC is an 
emerging area of medical care for women and parents who choose to continue 
their pregnancies after a life-limiting fetal diagnosis.164 The palliative care part 
of the model starts at the time of the fetal diagnosis, providing families with 
traditional maternal-fetal care, but also “physical, psychological, spiritual, or 
existential” care as culturally appropriate.165 The hospice part of care is medi-
                                                                                                                           
161 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(c)(2)(e) (West 2021); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
2158(A)(2)(a)–(c) (2021), amended by S.B. 1457, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021). 
 162 See COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 30 (describing the studies demonstrating that most 
women are certain of their abortion decision by the time they arrive at an abortion or family planning 
clinic). 
163 § 36-2158(A)(1)(a); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-2304 (2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-
1.1(5)(a)–(b) (West 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(6) (2021); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 
(West 2021); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-141(2) (2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-746.2 (West 
2021); § 253.10(3)(c)(2). Two state laws also mandate PHPC disclosure, but are not tied to abortion 
access. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-25-4.5-6 (requiring that provider notify patient about PHPC follow-
ing fetal diagnosis); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5003 (2021) (noting discretionary disclosure after diagno-
sis). In Indiana, a patient is informed of PHPC both at the time of diagnosis and at the abortion clinic. 
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-25-4.5-6. For a detailed description of these statutes, see generally Ashley 
Flakus, Choosing Wisely: Envisioning Perinatal Hospice Notification Laws That Inform and Empow-
er, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2020). Most of these statutes require disclosure of information on 
PHPC in case of a “lethal fetal condition.” See, e.g., § 36-2158(A)(1)(a), (G)(1) (mandating provision 
of information on PHPC when a woman seeks abortion due to a “lethal fetal condition” meaning “fetal 
condition that is diagnosed before birth and that will result, with reasonable certainty, in the death of 
the unborn child within three months after birth”); § 20-16-2304 (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-25-
4.5-2 (same). But see § 65-6709(a)(6), (m)(2) (mandating PHPC disclosure for “medically challenging 
pregnancies” defined as diagnosis of “(A) a severe anomaly; or (B) an illness, disease or defect which 
is invariably fatal”); tit. 63, § 1-746.1 (defining “[f]etal anomaly incompatible with life” as “profound 
and irremediable congenital or chromosomal anomaly that is incompatible with sustaining life after 
birth” (internal quotations omitted)).We will, however, continue to use the PHPC researcher preferred 
term of life-limiting fetal conditions. 
164 This care is commonly referred to as “perinatal hospice.” We, however, are using an acronym 
to differentiate the two types of care and help cure the “common misconception” that perinatal hos-
pice and palliative care are the same. Erin M. Denney-Koelsch & Denise Côté-Arsenault, Introduction 
to Perinatal Palliative Care, in PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL GUIDE 3, 5 (Erin M. Den-
ney-Koelsch & Denise Côté-Arsenault eds., 2020). In fact, in the case of stillbirth, the woman will 
only use the palliative care part of PHPC. 
165 Id. (footnote omitted); Charlotte Wool et al., Provision of Services in Perinatal Palliative 
Care: A Multicenter Survey in the United States, 19 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 279, 280 (2016). 
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cal care focused on comfort if the baby survives birth.166 Currently, most 
women learn of the possibility of PHPC from their obstetrician or maternal 
fetal specialist, genetic counselor, or nurse.167 
Despite its growth, accessibility to PHPC is not as broad as state statutes 
suggest.168 Kansas has a PHPC notification law,169 but has only three facilities, 
all of which are located around Kansas City in the eastern-most side of the 
state.170 Mississippi’s PHPC notification statute mandates that providers in-
form women of the availability of PHPC, yet only one program exists in Mis-
sissippi.171 Cost issues may also affect access.172 Insurance companies general-
ly cover the costs of pregnancy and childbirth using a single global fee, and 
PHPC may not be included in that global fee.173 This includes Medicaid, which 
covers almost half of all pregnancies each year in the United States.174 Many 
families may be unable to pay for the additional care on their own.175 Re-
                                                                                                                           
 166 Denney-Koelsch & Côté-Arsenault, supra note 164, at 5. 
167 Wool et al., supra 165 note, at 281 (describing that, in a survey, 97% of women were directly 
referred by their obstetrician or maternal fetal medicine provider, 73% learned from genetic counselor, 
60% learned from a nurse, another 60% learned from a nurse, 60% learned from a social worker, 61% 
learned from the internet, and 39% learned from “[o]ther”). Similarly, a perinatal hospice and pallia-
tive care coordinator based in Kansas estimated that 98% of their referrals came from obstetricians. 
Telephone Interview with Patti Lewis, Founder, Alexandra’s House (June 4, 2020). 
168 COMM. ON OBSTETRIC PRACTICE & COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNE-
COLOGISTS, COMM. OP. NO. 786, PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE, at e84, e87 (2019) (describing that 
use of perinatal palliative care is low due to the “availability of programs, patient access issues, and 
physician education and training barriers”). 
169 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65–6709(a)(6) (2021). 
170 BUREAU FAM. HEALTH, KAN. DEP’T HEALTH & ENV’T, IF YOU ARE PREGNANT DIRECTORY OF 
AVAILABLE SERVICES (2018), http://www.womansrighttoknow.org/download/Directory_of_Services_
English.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYK2-DB7D]. One Kansas PHPC center is actually located in Kansas 
City, Missouri. Id. 
171 Perinatal Hospice & Palliative Care Programs and Support, PERINATAL HOSPICE & PALLIA-
TIVE CARE, https://www.perinatalhospice.org/list-of-programs [https://perma.cc/3S4X-LGBP]. 
172 Little is known about the cost of PHPC. The Perinatal Hospice and Palliative Care website claims 
that PHPC is not expensive, but mentions that only one insurance plan specifically covers it. Frequently 
Asked Questions, PERINATAL HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE, https://www.perinatalhospice.org/faqs 
[https://perma.cc/8Q7J-XUVY]. It also explains that PHPC is no more expensive than abortion, and 
“[e]ven if perinatal hospice were to cost more, many parents say the value of treating their child with 
dignity, and the healing peace that comes from protecting and caring for their baby as long as he or 
she is able to live, cannot be measured in dollars and cents.” Id. 
173 Stefanie J. Hollenbach et al., Obstetric Management in Life-Limiting Fetal Conditions, in PER-
INATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL GUIDE, supra note 164, at 82. 
174 See KATHY GIFFORD ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID COVERAGE OF 
PREGNANCY AND PERINATAL BENEFITS: RESULTS FROM A STATE SURVEY 3, 15 (2017), http://files.
kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicaid-Coverage-of-Pregnancy-and-Perinatal-Benefits [https://perma.
cc/N2XB-VKTW] (“Maternity care is typically reimbursed with a global fee that covers all care for 
pregnant women through the postpartum period.”). 
175 Hollenbach et al., supra note 173, at 82. 
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searchers also note that significant barriers to PHPC care exist for poor women 
and women of color.176 
PHPC lacked political origins, but the anti-abortion movement has strategi-
cally adopted it as a “political tool.”177 For example, a prominent anti-abortion 
group, the Americans United for Life (UAL), created the Perinatal Hospice 
Information Act Model Legislation & Policy Guide.178 The guide explains that 
it is imperative that parents are informed of “more compassionate” options 
beside abortion.179 Again, UAL’s model legislation and all but one of these 
laws currently in place mandate notification for women seeking to terminate at 
the abortion clinic but not at diagnosis.180 Using abortion as a trigger for dis-
closure shows this is a tool for dissuasion, rather than neutral counseling relat-
ed to the prenatal diagnosis.181 
To date, there have been no challenges to the constitutionality of manda-
tory information about disabilities PHPC counseling. Any challenge would not 
likely be successful given the Court’s history of affirming statutes purportedly 
aimed at ensuring informed consent, even when the law expresses the state’s 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Natalia Henner et al., Considerations in Unique Populations in Perinatal Palliative Care: 
From Culture, Race, Infertility, and Beyond, in PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL GUIDE, 
supra note 164, at 361; see also Jill Wieber Lens, Miscarriage, Stillbirth, & Reproductive Justice, 98 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2021) (describing how the effectiveness of mental and emotional 
healthcare after stillbirth differs depending on the mother’s race). 
177 Danielle Paquette, Perinatal Hospice Care Prepares Parents for the End, at Life’s Beginning, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 16. 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/16/perinatal-
hospice-care-prepares-parents-for-the-end-at-lifes-beginning/ [https://perma.cc/T548-PW7A]; see 
Stassa Edwards, Perinatal Hospice Care Has Increasingly Become an Alternative to Abortion, JEZE-
BEL (Apr. 19, 2016), https://jezebel.com/perinatal-hospice-care-has-increasingly-become-an-alter-
1771783259 [https://perma.cc/2HLR-JUF7]. But see Caroline Kitchener, Brian Calhoun Says Abor-
tion Is Never Necessary to Save a Mother’s Life. He’s the Only High-Risk OB/GYN in Central West 
Virginia, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2021/the-lily/
antiabortion-doctor-obgyn-care/ [https://perma.cc/5KFN-X8R6] (claiming that an anti-abortion doctor 
developed perinatal hospice in the early 1990s consistent with his anti-abortion values). PHPC also 
appears to fall on the anti-abortion side of the abortion debate because the vast majority of women 
who choose to continue the pregnancy after receiving a life-threatening fetal diagnosis are religious. 
Jennifer Guon et al., Our Children Are Not a Diagnosis: The Experience of Parents Who Continue 
Their Pregnancy After a Prenatal Diagnosis of Trisomy 13 or 18, 164 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 308, 
310–11 (2013). PHPC, however, does not include religious care but does include spiritual care. Mau-
rice Hopkins, Spiritual Care in the Perinatal Period, in PERINATAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL 
GUIDE, supra note 164, at 234 (explaining the differences between religion and spirituality). 
178 See generally AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, PERINATAL HOSPICE INFORMATION ACT: MODEL LEG-
ISLATION & POLICY GUIDE FOR THE 2018 LEGISLATIVE YEAR (2017), https://aul.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/07/Perinatal-Hospice-Information-Act.docx [https://perma.cc/W8BU-JEYR]. 
179 Id. Arkansas’s PHPC law is identical to the model AUL legislation. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20–
16-2304 (2021). 
 180 See supra note 163 (discussing the laws with notification mandates in place). 
181 See Flakus, supra note 163, at 594 (discussing how such laws can dissuade women from ob-
taining an abortion. 
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preference for childbirth over abortion.182 In the context of PHPC, however, 
the laws also express the state’s preference for stillbirth or infant mortality 
over termination. Any anti-abortion success in decreasing abortion rates after 
fetal anomaly means an increase in stillbirth and infant mortality rates.183 
It is far from clear that disclosure laws will persuade women to continue a 
pregnancy. In the context of a fetal diagnosis, most of a woman’s decision-
making will occur in discussions with her doctors. By the time she has scheduled 
an appointment for an abortion, she has already made her decision and additional 
counseling on disabilities or PHPC is probably not going to make a large im-
pact.184 Plus, many life-threatening fetal diagnoses are made at the threshold of 
viability, after which state laws often prohibit abortion. Therefore, even if she 
was interested in PHPC, she’d have very little (if any) time to learn more before 
losing her ability to legally terminate in her state. Disclosure of information on 
disabilities and PHPC at the abortion clinic will likely not change the woman’s 
mind, but it may very well increase her emotional distress—causing increased 
“guilt[] for going through with a decision that now feels framed by the state as 
the ‘wrong’ choice to make.”185 The timing changes the disclosure “from an em-
powering piece of knowledge helping in making a decision to a last-ditch effort 
to dissuade her from the choice she has already made.”186 
                                                                                                                           
182 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) 
(discussing that information may be required to be disclosed to the patient, so long as the information 
is “truthful and not misleading”). 
183 The availability of abortion after a lethal fetal diagnosis is inextricably linked to stillbirth and 
infant mortality rates. When abortion is available: 
[C]ongenital abnormalities account for less than 10% [sic] all stillbirths after 22 weeks 
of gestation, with a median of 7.4% and a median rate of 0.4 per 1000 births . . . . Con-
versely with good diagnostics and where termination of pregnancy is illegal, a higher 
proportion of congenital abnormalities is reported (e.g., 21% in Ireland). 
Joy E. Lawn et al., Stillbirths: Rates, Risk Factors, and Acceleration Towards 2030, 387 LANCET 587, 
597 (2016); see also LINDA L. LAYNE, MOTHERHOOD LOST: A FEMINIST ACCOUNT OF PREGNANCY 
LOSS IN AMERICA 12 (2003) (explaining that “the fetal death rate due to lethal anomalies declined by 
almost half between the 1970s and 1980s” because of abortion (citation omitted) (internal quotations 
omitted)). Similarly, Canada’s infant mortality rates had remained stagnant between 1991 and 1995 
but then dramatically declined in 1996, with one study suggesting that the reason was increased prena-
tal diagnosis of abnormalities and terminations. Shiliang Liu et al., Relationship of Prenatal Diagnosis 
and Pregnancy Termination to Overall Infant Mortality in Canada, 287 JAMA 1561, 1563 (2002). 
184 See Flakus, supra note 163, at 595 (discussing that by the time a woman goes to a clinic to ob-
tain an abortion, they are “certain of their decision”). 
185 Id. (discussing the “serious emotional ramifications” that can occur in trying to persuade a 
woman to reconsider her decision to terminate a pregnancy). 
186 Id. 
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III. REFUTING THE STATE’S CLAIMED NEED TO PROTECT  
WOMEN FROM SECOND-TRIMESTER ABORTION 
It is clear that the anti-abortion movement has targeted second-trimester 
abortion as part of its stepping-stone campaign to end all abortion. State legis-
latures claim numerous justifications for the second-trimester abortion re-
strictions discussed above. One justification common to all of them is the 
woman-protective rationale—the idea that abortion hurts women, and women 
thus need protection from it.187 Professor Mary Ziegler highlighted that the 
weaponization of this rationale is the strategy of “abortion’s most sophisticated 
opponents.”188 Claiming that abortion actually harms women attempts to com-
bat the primary justification for abortion rights—that abortion is necessary for 
women to achieve equality and control their destiny.189 
The woman-protective rationale first surfaced in Casey to affirm an in-
formed consent provision that was purportedly necessary to prevent the psy-
chological consequences of a not-fully-informed decision to abort.190 Building 
on Casey, the rationale took center stage over a decade later in Gonzales v. 
Carhart, when the Court highlighted the need to prevent women from experi-
encing psychological distress when they later learn of the specifics of the D&X 
procedure—a distress unsupported by actual evidence.191 Since Carhart, states 
have attempted to rely on the woman-protective rationale to justify numerous 
abortion restrictions, including requiring abortion providers to have hospital 
admitting privileges nearby as a quality metric.192 This strategy is continuing 
                                                                                                                           
187 Most of these laws are also justified on the grounds that they are necessary to protect the fetus 
from either a “gruesome” death or from discrimination. These justifications are outside the scope of 
our paper. 
188 Mary Ziegler, Opinion, The Heartbeat Bills Were Never the Real Threat to Abortion Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/opinion/abortion-supreme-court.
html [https://perma.cc/8P3H-PYPE]. 
189 ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 145. 
190 Planned Parenthood Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (explain-
ing that an informed consent provision helps “reduc[e] the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, 
only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully 
informed”). 
191 See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and 
Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 837 (2007) (describing Carhart as “the first 
time [the Court adopted] a woman-protective justification for restricting access to abortion” (footnote 
omitted)). 
192 The woman-protective rationale was successful at convincing many lower courts that targeted 
restrictions on abortion provider (TRAP) laws—like the requirement that physicians have hospital 
admitting privileges—were constitutional. This line of reasoning was ultimately unsuccessful at con-
vincing the Supreme Court in 2016, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 
(2016). In 2020, in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, however, a majority of the Supreme Court 
stated that they would have held differently had the issue been one of first impression, and Chief Jus-
tice Roberts only concurred to uphold Whole Woman’s Health based on precedent. June Med. Servs. 
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today in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, where Mississippi 
justifies its fifteen-week ban by arguing, in part, that abortions have substantial 
health and emotional risks associated with them, which only increase as the 
pregnancy progresses.193 These risks, according to the state include “depres-
sion; anxiety; substance abuse; and other emotional or psychological prob-
lems.”194 
Notably, the woman-protective rationale entered the Court’s abortion ju-
risprudence long before Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,195 a case that 
Chief Justice John Roberts believes altered the Casey undue burden test by 
requiring the state to prove that the benefits of an abortion regulation outweigh 
its costs.196 Under the balancing test from Whole Woman’s Health, if a state 
abortion law had no benefits, then it would almost necessarily create an undue 
burden because the burdens would outweigh the non-existent benefits. In his 
concurrence in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, Chief Justice Roberts 
explained that Casey does not require a balancing of the benefits and burdens 
of an abortion restriction, but only an analysis of the burdens.197 At least theo-
retically, under the Chief Justice’s view, an abortion law does not need to bene-
fit women to be constitutional so long as it is not unduly burdensome. But de-
spite the Chief Justice’s restatement, it is clear that the Court relied on an abor-
tion law’s benefits in Carhart, which was issued before Whole Woman’s 
Health. 
And even if the Chief Justice doesn’t think a law’s benefits must out-
weigh its burdens, the woman-protective rationale can be used to justify the 
state’s interest in the law and to otherwise serve a legitimizing function. The 
rationale provides cover against the critique that the Court is prioritizing the 
fetus over the woman or ignoring women’s interests entirely. The rationale en-
ables the Court to claim, even if just in dicta, that the restriction benefits both 
the woman and the fetus. One scholar has posited that the rationale might even 
be raised more often and with less support if the law’s benefits are less integral 
                                                                                                                           
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133–2142 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Since then, the Court 
has only become more conservative with Justice Barrett and certainly, if Whole Woman’s Health were 
heard today, the Court would have decided differently. 
193 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 75, at 8. 
 194 Id. 
195 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
196 June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2136 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts voted with the 
majority, holding that Louisiana’s law in June Medical Services L.L.C. was unconstitutional, but he 
made clear that he would sympathetically review novel abortion restrictions. Id. at 2133. 
197 Id. The Fifth Circuit claimed to be following Chief Justice Roberts’s June Medical Services 
L.L.C. opinion in upholding Texas’s D&E ban and the Fifth Circuit still discussed the woman-
protective rationale in evaluating the state’s interest. Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, No. 17-
51060, 2021 WL 3661318, at *10–11, *15 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2136 (Rob-
erts, C.J., concurring)). 
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to the analysis and thus scrutinized less.198 And of course, the rationale—to the 
extent it is persuasive—also affects public opinion. 
This Part builds on existing legal scholarship that criticizes the paternal-
ism and gender stereotypes underpinning the woman-protective rationale gen-
erally,199 focusing on the special arguments made in the second trimester. Sec-
tion A exposes the paternalism and gender stereotypes behind D&X and D&E 
bans, and Section B focuses on restrictions regarding abortions due to fetal 
anomalies.200 Both Sections also present empirical evidence demonstrating that 
the laws will only harm women’s health.201 
A. Protection from “Gruesomeness” 
In Carhart, the Court relied heavily on the woman-protective rationale in 
upholding Congress’s ban on the D&X second-trimester abortion procedure. 
First, without citing any evidence, Justice Kennedy concluded that some wom-
en eventually regret their decision to abort.202 Then, he noted that the regret 
would be even stronger for women who later learn the specifics of the D&X 
procedure she received: 
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Reva B. Siegel, Why Restrict Abortion? Expanding the Frame on June Medical, 2020 SUP. 
CT. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 56), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3799645 [https://perma.cc/G5GA-VBQH] (“[W]e can see that conservative judges attacking bal-
ancing [from Whole Woman’s Health] are embracing standards that will legitimate the woman-
protective health justifications of TRAP laws and weaken the restrictions that Casey imposes on 
them.”). 
199 See, e.g., Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 224 (2009) (describing that the current state of the law 
does not take into consideration that women are fully capable enough to make the decision to have an 
abortion); see also EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 87, at 198–99 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s remarks 
in Carhart); Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion 
Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1615 (2008) (noting that the Court in Carhart “portrays women 
as unusually fragile and unable to make informed choices about” obtaining an abortion); Reva B. 
Siegel, Professor of L., Yale Univ., The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of 
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, Brainerd Currie Memorial Lecture Before Duke Law 
School (Mar. 1, 2007), in 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1688 (2008) (discussing how anti-abortion activists 
portray women as “too weak or confused” to make the decision to have an abortion and that laws need 
to protect them); Reva B. Siegel, Professor of L., Yale Univ., The New Politics of Abortion: An 
Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture 
Before University of Illinois College of Law (Apr. 17, 2006), in 2007 ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 [hereinaf-
ter Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion] (explaining that the anti-abortion movement now seeks to 
“protect[] women’s health and choices as mothers”). 
 200 See infra notes 202–267 and accompanying text. 
 201 See infra notes 202–267 and accompanying text. 
 202 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007). 
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choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Se-
vere depression and loss of esteem can follow. 
 In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doc-
tors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that will 
be used, confining themselves to the required statement of risks the 
procedure entails. . . . 
 . . . It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice 
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more 
profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did 
not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum 
the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the 
human form.203 
Thus, the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s psychological well-being 
served as a basis for constitutionally depriving her of a safe and available sec-
ond-trimester medical procedure. 
Carhart created the blueprint for the recent en banc Fifth Circuit decision 
finding Texas’s D&E ban constitutional.204 The Fifth Circuit quoted this exact 
language from Carhart about a woman’s later realization and explained the 
same was true with Texas’s law—women were not being told “that the fetus’s 
body parts—arms, legs, ribs, skull, and everything else—will be ripped apart 
and pulled out piece by piece.”205 The Fifth Circuit also more generally in-
voked the woman-protective rationale, recounting the State’s evidence that 
“women seeking abortions benefit physically and psychologically when fetal 
death occurs before dismemberment” as fetal demise “can help with emotional 
difficulties for the patient.”206 Thus, depriving women of the option of a D&E 
without fetal demise beforehand is actually in their best interest. 
Other states have also argued this same analogy between Congress’s D&X 
ban and their own D&E bans. Arkansas first described the “chillingly barbaric” 
nature of the procedure,207 and argued that a woman would feel psychological 
distress when she later learned the specifics.208 These statements are supported 
                                                                                                                           
203 Id. (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy overlooks the real reason that doctors may not disclose 
the specifics of an abortion procedure, mainly because informed consent law does not require it. See 
infra notes 333–335 and accompanying text (explaining that a provider is not required to explain the 
details of an abortion procedure to a woman). 
 204 Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, No. 17-51060, 2021 WL 3661318 (5th Cir. 2021). 
 205 Id. at *8. 
 206 Id. at *7. 
207 Brief of Appellants at 31, 31–32, Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2020) (No. 17-
2879). 
208 See id. at 6 (noting that one woman lamented that none of her medical providers explained the 
procedure—“that the limbs of my baby would be ripped apart and torn out” or “the emotional and 
psychological” cost of enduring the procedure (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted)). 
2176 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2145 
by women, claiming as amici, that they would not have consented to the abortion 
if they had known the details. Just as Texas did, Arkansas also argued that fetal 
demise beforehand psychologically benefits “an overwhelming majority of pa-
tients” because it may alleviate the difficult emotions the procedure can 
evoke.209 Indiana similarly argued that its D&E ban “protects women’s mental 
health by ensuring that women seeking abortion do not have a D&E only later to 
discover the brutal and inhumane way in which the fetus was killed.”210 Indiana 
also added that the protection was especially necessary because women seeking 
second-trimester abortion are especially susceptible to experiencing a “wide 
range of adverse psychological reactions” after an abortion.211 
These arguments are laden with gender stereotypes—that women should 
be horrified of the D&X and D&E procedures.212 And thus, any woman who 
did consent to these procedures—as Professor Reva Siegel explained in other 
abortion contexts—must have been “mistaken or misled or coerced or pres-
sured into decision[s] they do not want to make and should not make because 
abortion violates women’s nature as mothers.”213 Further, the state reinforces 
yet another prominent gender stereotype of the emotional pregnant woman, 
incompetent to make medical decisions, when it suggests that women are best 
protected by banning the procedure, instead of informing them about what the 
procedure entails beforehand. Justice Ginsburg and legal scholars have noted 
this paternalism in the D&X context.214 For instance, Professor Maya Manian 
                                                                                                                           
209 Id. at 34. 
210 See Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 14, Bernard v. Individual Members of the Ind. Med. Licensing Bd., 392 F. Supp. 3d 935 (S.D. Ind. 
2019) (No. 1:19–cv–1660); see also Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction or Temp. Restraining Ord. at 46, Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, 397 
F. Supp. 3d 1213 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (No. 4:19–cv–00449), 2019 WL 7563579 (arguing that D&E abor-
tions lead “real Arkansas women suffer profound grief and sorrow caused by their decision to have a 
dismemberment abortion of a quickened, unborn child”); Defendant Brinkman’s Response in Opposi-
tion to Motion for Temp. Restraining Ord. and/or Preliminary Injunction at 12, EMW Women’s Sur-
gical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, 373 F. Supp. 3d 807 (W.D. Ky. 2019) (No. 3:18–cv–00224) (“Indeed, any 
abortion has the potential to result in grief or anguish for the mother who has chosen to abort her 
child.”). 
211 Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, su-
pra note 210, at 14 (citation omitted). 
 212 See Maroney, supra note 24, at 900. 
213 Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 199, at 1013; see also Reva B. Siegel, Digni-
ty and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 
1792 (2008) (“The new gender paternalism is in fact the old gender paternalism: laws . . . for the 
claimed purpose of protecting women from coercion and/or freeing them to be mothers.”). 
214 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 184 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The solution 
the Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the 
different procedures and their attendant risks. Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make 
an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.” (citation omitted)); see also EKLAND-
OLSON, supra note 87, at 198 (“In a textbook example of paternalism, [the Court] wanted to protect 
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has explained that outside of the abortion context, the law does not interfere with 
non-pregnant, mentally competent adults making critical decisions related to 
their healthcare that they may regret afterwards. Yet when it comes to a pregnant 
woman making the decision to obtain an abortion, the law suggests that “some-
one other than the patient knows better what life choices will lead to mentally 
healthy consequences,” and therefore she must be protected from herself.215 
Actual evidence, however, shows the opposite—that D&Xs and D&Es 
can be psychologically beneficial for women.216 This is especially true when a 
D&X is requested in the context of fetal anomaly. As one scholar has noted, Jus-
tice Kennedy ignored evidence that some women preferred the D&X to avoid 
regret by saying goodbye to a wanted pregnancy: “This is precisely because the 
intact process produces what Justice Kennedy found an unthinkable preference: 
an entire fetal body . . . .”217 For these women, the prospect of “seeing, holding, 
and bidding goodbye to their baby” after the abortion was vital.218 
[After the D&X], if the patient wants to see the fetus, [the hospital 
staff] will prepare [the fetus] to make it look as untraumatized as 
possible. They have little gowns that they dress the fetus in. They 
wrap it very gently in a blanket. They sometimes have a little bonnet 
that they put over the head. . . . . And then they present this to the 
patient and generally her husband as well. And the patients are 
sometimes satisfied with that, and sometimes they completely undress 
the fetus, and look at it, and touch it, and cry, and say good-bye.”219 
This described practice is called “memory-making.” Giving women this option 
is part of the standard of care after stillbirth, and also common in PHPC.220 
Extensive and almost undisputed empirical evidence of women after stillbirth 
shows that this time with the baby psychologically benefits the mother.221 
                                                                                                                           
her, even if her own values and assessment of the situation differed from theirs.”); CAROL SANGER, 
ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AMERICA 132 (2017) 
(“[T]he Court decided that it is better for everyone to ban the whole thing rather than to force a con-
frontation through disclosure ahead of time.”); Dresser, supra note 199, at 1615 (“Abortion disclosure 
laws separate women deciding about abortion from people deciding about other kinds of medical 
interventions.”). 
215 Manian, supra note 199, at 259. 
216 See Donley, supra note 56, at 225–31 (describing D&X and D&E procedures and their mental 
and emotional effects on women). 
217 SANGER, supra note 214, at 151. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. (footnote omitted); see also Joint Appendix at 43–44, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007) (No. 05–380), 2006 WL 1440830. 
220 See infra notes 363–365 and accompanying text (discussing providers offering the option of 
memory-making). 
221 See infra notes 363–365 and accompanying text (exploring the potential benefits of memory-
making). 
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There is no reason to think the same benefits would not inure in the abortion 
context when a woman chooses memory-making. The D&X gave women the 
ability to hold their child intact without requiring them to give birth with an 
induction abortion.222 Thus, the D&X was a cheaper, less risky, and less inva-
sive procedure that still allowed a face-to-face goodbye.223 Admittedly, far 
from all women who have D&Xs would desire memory-making, but as ex-
plored below, some find it beneficial and have fewer negative emotions if al-
lowed to receive it. 
Even though these bans theoretically allow D&E and D&X procedures to 
continue if fetal demise is initiated beforehand, studies show that fetal demise 
before a D&E can actually increase psychological difficulty for some wom-
en.224 Though some women reported feeling that their abortion was more ac-
ceptable with fetal demise, others specifically expressed emotional difficulty 
when fetal demise was induced a day or more in advance of the procedure, as 
is common, because they were troubled by the idea of carrying a dead fetus. 
For the women who had started to feel fetal movement, the immediate cessa-
tion of movement could be jarring. Notably, some of the women who were ul-
timately reassured by the fetal demise were still troubled with the decreased fetal 
movement and carrying of a dead fetus. Women experiencing pregnancy loss 
echo these sentiments, describing having lost their agency in “becom[ing] the 
passive vessel of a corpse. One woman described feeling like ‘a human coffin,’ 
another like ‘a living tomb.’”225 Thus, there is no one-size-fits-all approach 
that justifies requiring all women who need second-trimester abortions to first 
instigate fetal demise. It is a helpful resource for many women, but a distress-
ing one for others, and women should be able to choose if it would be benefi-
cial to them. 
Similarly, the possibility of induction abortion—as an alternative to fetal 
demise that would also be permissible under the statute—would not protect 
women’s interests. Studies demonstrate that women prefer D&Es and D&Xs 
over induction abortion because induction abortion is almost identical to child-
birth.226 In a European study, some women who had induction abortions re-
                                                                                                                           
222 COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 209–11. 
223 Though some memory-making is available with a D&E, only the D&X allows women to hold 
an intact baby. 
224 See generally McNamara et al., supra note 120, at 516, 516–18 (describing the “[v]aried un-
derstanding” of fetal demise among women and evaluating women’s experience with this procedure 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 225 LAYNE, supra note 183, at 86 (citations omitted). 
226 See Purcell et al., supra note 38, at 174–76 (recounting women’s experiences of second-
trimester abortion by labor induction and its parallels to childbirth). The study describes that one 
group of women had an abortion by labor induction, which was called a “medication” abortion. Id. at 
165. The other group had a D&E with fetal demise beforehand. Id. 
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sented health professionals treating them in the same way that women in 
childbirth are treated and reported that delivering the fetus was traumatic and 
painful. One woman was especially distressed at the idea of the abortion occur-
ring while lying back in a bed, just like childbirth. The authors explained that 
the similarities to childbirth detracted from the idea of second-trimester abor-
tion as a necessary healthcare procedure.227 The women who had D&Es re-
ported less distress at the procedure.228 
The similarities between induction abortions and childbirth are likely not 
lost on the anti-abortion movement. An induction equates abortion to child-
birth—a defining experience of motherhood for many women.229 Requiring 
birth would condition abortion on a woman’s willingness to confront her fetus 
and agree to deliver a child to force its death. The point is to make abortion 
distressing and painful, to shame them into continuing the pregnancy, to force 
them to choose between giving birth to a live child or a dead one. “Legislators 
have decided that some experience of one’s infant, if only childbirth itself, is 
necessary to grasp the profound nature of what is at stake in the decision to 
separate from one’s baby.”230 Requiring fetal demise before a surgical abortion 
or requiring abortion via labor induction creates a medical experience similar 
to a woman whose pregnancy ends naturally before birth, in either late miscar-
riage or early stillbirth. Perhaps state legislators are hoping these similarities 
will “correct” women to act more like mothers.231 
B. Good Mothers and Children with Disabilities 
The woman-protective rationale is also front and center in state defenses 
of disability-selective abortion bans and PHPC counseling laws. States claim 
that a ban is needed to protect women who “feel ‘bullied’ into aborting their 
                                                                                                                           
 227 Id. at 180. 
228 Id. at 176 (“The accounts of women who had undergone surgical procedures thus appeared to 
be more distanced from the corporeality of the procedure . . . .”). 
229 See SANGER, supra note 214, at 122 (describing state attempts to force women to feel like 
mothers before abortion). 
230 Id. at 119. Another way legislators can force women to confront their fetus is through manda-
tory ultrasound laws. See J. Aidan Lang, Note, The Right to Remain Silent: Abortion and Compelled 
Physician Speech, 62 B.C. L. REV. 2091, 2091–95 (2021) (discussing state laws that require informed 
consent and ultrasound prior to an abortion—including a mandate that physicians point out the fetus’s 
features to a patient as they conduct an ultrasound, which can be distressing for a woman who has 
chosen to terminate a pregnancy due to fetal abnormalities). 
 231 Women who experience pregnancy loss are often pegged against those experiencing abortion, 
but the reality is that these two groups have a lot in common. We explore this issue in depth in a 
forthcoming paper. 
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unborn child”232 because doctors allegedly pressure or mislead women into 
abortions after prenatal diagnosis.233 States claim that physicians “provide bi-
ased information” and commit “overt or subtle bias or coercion.”234 Not only 
do women, supposedly, need protection from aggressive doctors, they also 
need it from themselves—their decision to abort, according to the state, will 
deny them the joy and psychological benefit of raising a child with special 
needs.235 Essentially, the state thinks that parents will make decisions based on 
ableist stereotypes and should be prevented from doing so. 
The Sixth Circuit recently relied on both of these paternalistic ideas in 
upholding Ohio’s ban on abortions based on a fetal Down Syndrome diagno-
sis.236 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit, in Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, ex-
plained the asserted state interest to protect “families from coercive healthcare 
practices” demonstrated by uncited “[e]mpirical reports” from parents that 
“doctors explicitly encouraged abortion or emphasized the challenges or rais-
ing children with Down [S]yndrome.”237 Judge John K. Bush’s concurring 
opinion also suggested that this law will be good for parents and families be-
cause their child will make them happy: “79% of parents of children with 
Down [S]yndrome felt that ‘their outlook on life was more positive because of 
their child,’ and 88% of people whose siblings have Down Syndrome felt that 
they were better people for their sibling’s presence in their life.”238 
                                                                                                                           
232 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Planned 
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859 (S.D. 
Ind. 2017) (No. 1:16-CV-763) (citation omitted). 
233 Sec’y Meier’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 17, EMW Women’s 
Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, No. 3:19-cv-00178, 2019 WL 1233575 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2019). 
234 Brief of Defendants-Appellants Lance Himes, Kim G. Rothermel, and Bruce R. Saferin at 18, 
Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 940 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 18–3329); id. at 20 (citation omitted) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temp. Re-
straining Ord. and/or Preliminary Injunction at 15–16, Memphis Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slatery, 
No. 3:20-cv-00501 (M.D. Tenn. July 24, 2020) (arguing that “medical professionals often pressure 
expectant mothers who receive a Down [S]yndrome diagnosis to have an abortion and fail to provide 
them with accurate information about the child’s prognosis.” (citation omitted)). 
235 Sec’y Meier’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 233, at 23; 
see also Brief of Appellants at 19–21, Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis 
Region, v. Parson, (8th Cir. 2021) (Nos. 19–2882, 19–3134) (explaining that parents are happy with 
their decision to have their child with Down Syndrome and that the child brings joy to their families). 
236 See 994 F.3d 512, 581–82 (6th Cir. 2021) (Donald, J., dissenting) (discussing the need for 
women to be protected from “coercive abortions”). Notably, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the ban as 
not a total ban because a pregnant patient could still receive an abortion if they did not reveal the ba-
sis. Id. at 522 (majority opinion). 
237 Id. at 518. Logically, one would presume that this alleged pressure is exerted before a woman 
makes her decision, that is before she enters the abortion clinic. The state law, however, would affect 
only the doctor performing the abortion at the clinic. 
238 Id. at 549–50 (Bush, J., concurring) (citing Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r 
of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300, 316 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d 
in part, Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019) (Manion, J., concur-
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States also use the woman-protective rationale to justify restrictions on 
abortion in the case of life-threatening or fatal conditions. Some claim, “the 
grieving process is actually better for the woman by actually going ahead and 
giving birth,”239 and that women will experience “more despair and depres-
sion” if they terminate than if the child is stillborn or dies in hospice.240 PHPC 
laws similarly note the purported psychological benefit of continuing a preg-
nancy after a fatal prenatal diagnosis. Arkansas’s PHPC law expressly states 
that termination can cause women to experience more serious long-term men-
tal health issues, whereas continuing the pregnancy with PHPC allows families 
to be “emotionally and spiritually prepared for the birth” and death of their 
child.241 A required brochure produced by the Indiana Department of Health242 
provides similar advice and also suggests that abortion can delay and compli-
cate the healing process.243 Whereas, “mothers who chose to carry their baby to 
term recover to baseline mental health more quickly than those who aborted due 
to fetal anomaly” accentuating that PHPC is psychologically safe for women.244 
The idea that women are bullied into terminating after a prenatal diagno-
sis relies on the sexist stereotype of the incompetent or vulnerable pregnant 
woman overly susceptible to suggestion or persuasion, as does the state’s solu-
tion to ban these abortions.245 First and foremost, it is important to note that 
                                                                                                                           
ring in part and dissenting in part)). Judge Bush also echoed and cited to Seventh Circuit Judge Daniel 
Manion’s partial concurring opinion, which concluded that Indiana’s Down Syndrome ban was consti-
tutional because parents of children with Down Syndrome “are quite happy and lead fulfilling lives” 
and because children with Down Syndrome are a joy to be around. Id.; Planned Parenthood of Ind. & 
Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d at 315 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
239 Eric Adler, ‘I Would Have Delivered a Dead Baby.’ Missouri Law Denies Abortion for Fatal 
Disorders, KAN. CITY STAR, https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article231942993.
html [https://perma.cc/28FF-9DTF] (Aug. 5, 2019) (quoting Susan Liebel, State Director, Susan B. 
Anthony List). 
240 Arya Sundaram, Texas Senate Removes Exception That Allows Abortion After 20 Weeks if the 
Pregnancy Is Unviable, TEX. TRIB. (May 7, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/07/texas-
abortion-law-allowing-procedures-after-20-weeks-removed-senate/ [https://perma.cc/GY69-MADE]. 
241 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-2302(a)(4)–(5) (2021). 
242 See generally PERINATAL HOSPICE BROCHURE, IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH (2016), https://
www.in.gov/isdh/files/Perinatal%20Hospice%20Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZH2-M5BG]. The 
brochure also warns of physical risks of terminating and claims childbirth has no increased risk. Id. at 
2. But increased physical risks do exist in stillbirth. See Jill Wieber Lens, Medical Paternalism, Still-
birth, & Blindsided Mothers, 106 IOWA L. REV. 665, 670–72 (2021) (discussing research showing that 
women face more life-threatening complications in stillbirth than in live childbirth); see also Elizabeth 
Wall-Wieler et al., Severe Maternal Morbidity Among Stillbirth and Live Birth Deliveries in California, 
134 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 310, 312 (2019) (explaining that the chances of life-threatening com-
plications for the woman are nearly five times greater in a stillbirth than a live birth). 
243 See generally PERINATAL HOSPICE BROCHURE, supra note 242. 
244 Id. at 2. 
 245 Siegel, supra note 198, at 25 (“In addition to arguing that access to abortion threatened wom-
en’s health, Reardon also argued that access to abortion threatened women’s freedom. Women were 
coerced into abortions that traumatized them.” (footnote omitted)). 
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studies contradict states’ claims that women are pressured into abortion after a 
prenatal diagnosis.246 And this makes sense—what would motivate a doctor to 
encourage abortion? What stake would they have in that outcome? But even if 
it were true, the obvious solution would be to mandate neutral counseling that 
occurs at the time of diagnosis, not at the time of abortion. In fact, the federal 
Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act already at-
tempts to provide additional resources to parents facing a prenatal diagnosis 
that are neutral and unbiased.247 Instead, the state argues that women must be 
deprived of abortion as an option, suggesting that pregnant women cannot be 
trusted to make the right choice for themselves and their families even with 
accurate and unbiased information. 
Similarly, the need to protect women from abortion after a prenatal diag-
nosis is also based on stereotypical, gendered notions of motherhood. The no-
tion that motherhood is a gift regardless of a child’s disability relies solely on 
traditional gender stereotypes about “good” mothers, playing on the shame 
some women may already feel by considering abortion.248 According to the 
archetype, a good mother would never choose to end her potential child’s life. 
She would embrace any disabilities affecting her fetus and selflessly give her-
self over as a caretaker regardless of the sacrifices that are entailed.249 If her 
fetus suffered a life-threatening diagnosis, a good mother would want to savor 
the limited time she had left with her baby before he or she died—she would 
seek PHPC to ease her fears and experience the “life and death” of her child in 
a secure, supportive setting with her family.250 These stereotypes, however, are 
not based on a woman’s actual experiences. Women who terminate after learn-
ing of a fetal anomaly often report doing so out of the love they have for their 
                                                                                                                           
246 See, e.g., Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Maternal Decision to Terminate Pregnancy After Diag-
nosis of Down Syndrome, 196 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 149.e1, 149.e4 (2007) (explaining 
that only one woman in the entire study reported feeling pressure from her health care provider to 
terminate her pregnancy). 
247 Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 
Stat. 4051 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8). 
248 See Nao Araki, The Experiences of Pregnant Women Diagnosed with a Fetal Abnormality, 24 
J. JAPAN ACAD. MIDWIFERY 358, 361 (2010) (discussing the pressure a mother can feel in trying to be 
a “good mother” (internal quotations omitted)). 
249 See id. (discussing the isolation and uncertainty that women may experience in taking care of 
their child). Anti-abortion activists similarly attempted to shame women terminating due to fetal 
anomaly within the debate over D&X abortions before Carhart, describing even fatal anomalies “as 
inconveniences which callous parents used to justify abortion, but that loving parents should confront 
and overcome.” Oliveri, supra note 84, at 409. 
250 See MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-141(2) (2021) (explaining why some women would choose 
PHPC). 
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child and not wanting to watch their child suffer in this world.251 Many women 
also terminate because they think it is in the best interest of their living chil-
dren, who they also feel bound to protect.252 
We do not challenge the fact that many parents who have children with 
disabilities love them unconditionally and are eternally grateful for their exist-
ence. But this is a self-selecting group of parents who had the option of termi-
nating and chose to continue the pregnancy. It is inappropriate to extrapolate 
this positive experience onto parents who would have otherwise terminated. 
We also note that it is not surprising that women express joy in having a child. 
There is enormous pressure to publicly express gratitude for a child, even 
when one’s feelings are more conflicted. The duty to embrace motherhood 
means that “[r]egret over motherhood becomes inappropriate once a child is 
born.”253 This social pressure is so strong that it is difficult to evaluate the reli-
ability of any study regarding the decision to have the child.254 That is not to 
say that it is better for women to terminate in the face of a prenatal diagnosis—
it’s not. For any given family, the “best” decision will be different. 
Further, studies show that women who choose to terminate a pregnancy 
after a prenatal diagnosis do not regret their decision, nor do women who con-
tinue the pregnancy.255 Relatedly, for decades, tort law has recognized the rea-
sonableness of a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy due to a fetal diag-
nosis.256 Specifically, a wrongful birth claim allows a woman to sue for dam-
                                                                                                                           
251 See Donley, supra note 56, at 208–09, 226–28 (recounting a woman’s story of choosing to ob-
tain an abortion and discussing the motivation behind decisions to terminate in the case of severe fetal 
anomaly). 
252 Jamie R. Abrams, The Polarization of Reproductive and Parental Decision-Making, 44 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1281, 1309–10 (2017). 
253 Katrien Schaubroeck & Kristien Hens, Parental Choices and the Prospect of Regret: An Al-
ternative Account, 25 INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 586, 590 (2017) (citation omitted). 
254 Id. at 589. 
255 See, e.g., Korenromp et al., supra note 246, at 149.e3 (explaining that only 6% of women in a 
survey expressed regret over terminating, 75% of whom felt regret “occasionally” and 25% of whom 
felt regret “strongly”); Stina Lou et al., Termination of Pregnancy Following a Prenatal Diagnosis of 
Down Syndrome: A Qualitative Study of the Decision-Making Process of Pregnant Couples, 97 ACTA 
OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 1228, 1234 (2018) (discussing that couples did not 
regret their decision to terminate a pregnancy). 
256 See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 265, 276 (2003) (“The single largest number of wrongful birth cases have been brought for fail-
ure to provide information about the risk of Down [S]yndrome to women of ‘advanced maternal 
age.’”); see, e.g., Wilkie v. Aslam, No. 08-1425, 2009 WL 3487903, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2009) 
(discussing the issue of whether a physician was negligent in not informing a parent of the increased 
risk that her child would be born with Down Syndrome and whether the diagnosis was the proximate 
cause of needing to provide post-majority care); Fruiterman v. Granata, 668 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Va. 
2008) (reversing a wrongful birth suit for lack of demonstrating proximate causation); see also Daniel 
W. Whitney & Kenneth N. Rosenbaum, Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Birth, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 
167, 170–71, 171 (2011) (explaining that wrongful birth cases are brought when children have severe 
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ages based on the lost ability to terminate her pregnancy due to medical mal-
practice in failing to diagnose or disclose birth defects. Courts have specifical-
ly rejected the idea of reducing a mother’s damages for wrongful birth because 
of the joy she also may experience in raising her child—her joy does not justi-
fy depriving her of the ability to make an informed decision whether to termi-
nate.257 These studies and this history show that a woman is not better off psy-
chologically or otherwise if forced to continue a pregnancy after a prenatal 
diagnosis. It is an immensely personal choice, and women are generally con-
tent with their choice either way. 
Similarly, little to no evidence actually supports the state’s argument that 
women are better off continuing a pregnancy even when the fetus is not ex-
pected to survive. In fact, actual PHPC research contradicts state’s claims that 
PHPC is psychologically superior for women than terminating.258 These re-
searchers expressly conclude that women who choose to terminate and who 
choose to continue their pregnancy express a “similar rate of regret.”259 A liter-
ature review in 2011 similarly concluded that women who choose to terminate 
later in the pregnancy due to fetal anomaly experience “no worse” mental 
health effects than women who continue their pregnancy and give birth to a 
baby with fatal or serious health conditions, or endure stillbirth or later miscar-
riage.260 These researchers understand the reality that most women will suffer 
psychological distress regardless of their choice due to the inevitability of their 
child’s death. 
                                                                                                                           
birth defects versus “minor genetic defect[s]” and classifying Down Syndrome as a severe birth de-
fect). That a wrongful birth claim has existed for decades, however, does not mean it is uncontrover-
sial. See generally Lydia X.Z. Brown, Legal Ableism, Interrupted: Developing Tort Law & Policy 
Alternatives to Wrongful Birth & Wrongful Life Claims, 38 DISABILITY STUD. Q., no. 2, 2018, https://
dsq-sds.org/article/view/6207/4903 [https://perma.cc/95BU-D4B6] (providing an overview of the 
history of wrongful birth claims). 
257 Lodato ex rel. Lodato v. Kappy, 803 A.2d 160, 165–66 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2002). 
258 Denney-Koelsch & Côté-Arsenault, supra note 164, at 8. 
259 Id. (emphasis added); see also Marijke J. Korenromp et al., Adjustment to Termination of 
Pregnancy for Fetal Anomaly: A Longitudinal Study in Women at 4, 8, and 16 Months, 201 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 160.e1, 160.e4 (2009) (“In spite of the large and long-lasting psycho-
logical consequences of [termination] for fetal anomaly, [less than] 3% of women at each occasion 
mentioned feelings of strong regret. There was clear improvement over time for all the women for all 
outcome measures. . . . [T]he majority of women adapted well to their loss.”). 
260 Julia R. Steinberg, Later Abortions and Mental Health: Psychological Experiences of Women 
Having Later Abortions—A Critical Review of Research, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES (SUPP. ISSUE 
3) S44, S47 (2011). The study also pointed out that “factors associated with having later abortions 
may also put women at risk of psychological problems after later abortions” instead of the later abor-
tion itself. Id. at S45. They include the “reasons for the delay” in obtaining an abortion, “level of 
wantedness of the pregnancy, experiences of adverse life circumstances, mental health, demographic 
and economic factors, type of procedure, experiences of fetal movement, and stigma.” Id. (citations 
omitted). 
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Admittedly, at least one study exists concluding that women who chose to 
continue their pregnancy reported less despair and depression than women 
who chose to terminate their pregnancies after a lethal fatal diagnosis of anen-
cephaly.261 Numerous problems exist with the study, including its failure to 
account for the woman’s mental health prior to the fetal diagnosis.262 The study 
also suggests that society more readily acknowledges and accepts stillbirth and 
infant death,263 which runs contrary to other substantial research describing the 
isolation women feel after stillbirth and infant death.264 The study also inaccu-
rately implies that memory-making is available only after pregnancy continua-
tion and not after abortion.265 But perhaps the largest problem with the use of 
this study to regulate abortion is the fact that the study’s findings depend on 
the woman’s choice—that these women were offered and declined termination. 
One cannot extrapolate from them that women who are forced to continue 
pregnancies would fare as well psychologically as women who actively chose 
to continue the pregnancy. In fact, one could assume that given the traumatic 
nature of the circumstance, removing a woman’s limited autonomy would only 
deepen her agony. 
We want to conclude with a note about truly supported decision-making. 
It is certainly true that many parents are overwhelmed and scared when first 
learning of a prenatal diagnosis; they may not know what to expect in raising a 
child with special needs and may even default to ableist assumptions. That is 
why it is so important that they receive neutral and accurate information on the 
particular fetal anomaly at the time of diagnosis. In an ideal world, expectant 
                                                                                                                           
261 See Heidi Cope et al., Pregnancy Continuation and Organizational Religious Activity Follow-
ing Prenatal Diagnosis of a Lethal Fetal Defect Are Associated with Improved Psychological Out-
come, 35 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 761, 766 (2015) (“Pregnancy continuation was also associated with 
less psychiatric distress . . . . As a group, women who continued reported . . . less despair, avoidance 
and depression than women who terminated. . . . . [T]he active choice involved in termination [ap-
pears] to increase the likelihood that guilt will be experienced . . . .”). 
262 See Steinberg, supra note 260, at S45 (explaining that it is “important to consider how prior 
mental health [is] controlled for in analyses, because it is a strong predictive factor of mental health 
postpregnancy” (citations omitted)). 
263 Cope et al., supra note 261, at 767. 
264 See Maureen C. Kelley & Susan B. Trinidad, Silent Loss and the Clinical Encounter: Parents’ 
and Physicians’ Experiences of Stillbirth—A Qualitative Analysis, 12 BMC PREGNANCY & CHILD-
BIRTH, Nov. 27, 2012, at 1, 9 (describing that parents feel isolated due to “the awkwardness and dis-
comfort felt by others when parents of a stillborn try to discuss their experience, or when they try to 
normalize it by mentioning their stillborn child alongside their live children as part of their family”); 
see also Samantha Murphy & Joanne Cacciatore, The Psychological, Social, and Economic Impact of 
Stillbirth on Families, 22 SEMINARS IN FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 129, 131 (2017) (“[S]tillbirth is a 
loss often unacknowledged and invalidated by society.” (footnote omitted)). 
 265 See Cope et al., supra note 261, at 767 (“Continuing the pregnancy also allows more opportu-
nities to find meaning and for memory making, such as opportunities to hold and care for the baby, 
take photographs, create other keepsakes and perhaps participate in research, tissue or organ donation, 
all of which can contribute positively to the grieving process.” (footnote omitted)). 
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parents would be connected to—and have time to connect with—parents who 
made either choice, to understand the reality of both experiences. Similarly, in 
case of a life-limiting fetal condition, the obstetrician or maternal fetal special-
ist should continue to provide information on and referral to PHPC at the time 
of the prenatal diagnosis, long before the woman enters the abortion clinic.266 
Women should have access to this care regardless of their geography or eco-
nomic means. For a woman to make a fully informed decision about whether 
to terminate or continue a pregnancy, she needs the most complete an accurate 
picture that can be provided at the relevant time.267 Abortion laws only convo-
lute this process—they force women to make rushed decisions and heavily 
burden one choice over the other. They do not protect women; they coerce and 
shame them. 
Part III has demonstrated how the woman-protective rationale underlying 
these second-trimester abortion restrictions is paternalistic, dependent on gen-
der stereotypes, and factually dubious or incorrect. Unfortunately, this defen-
sive approach has not been sufficient to persuade courts to reject the woman-
protective rationale underlying these second-trimester abortion restrictions. In 
Carhart, for instance, the Court’s analysis was based not on science, but the 
Justices’ intuition.268 The Court even ignored some of the countervailing evi-
dence presented above that the D&X helped some women avoid regret by say-
ing goodbye. “[T]he great error of the Carhart majority’s invocation of emo-
tional common sense” was to “privilege[] the individual Justices’ own emo-
tional . . . reaction to the intact D&E method,” “ignore[] other permissible 
meaning structures,” and “force[] a false consensus.”269 Instead, the Carhart 
opinion actually permits the state to reach its own scientific conclusions, even 
if they are contradicted by the medical establishment.270 
As a result, Part IV recommends a new approach to dismantling the wom-
an-protective rationale underlying second-trimester abortion restrictions. It 
suggests that the abortion rights movement can fight back against many of the 
woman-protective claims with greater openness about second-trimester abor-
                                                                                                                           
266 See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing when women are informed about 
PHPC). 
267 See COMM. ON OBSTETRIC PRACTICE & COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 168, at e88 (explain-
ing that “tenets of informed consent require that patients be presented with this full array of reasonable 
and ethically acceptable options” after a lethal fetal diagnosis, including abortion and perinatal pallia-
tive care). 
268 See Maroney, supra note 24, at 901 (describing that Justice Kennedy thought the D&X proce-
dure “morally (not just physically) disgusting” (footnote omitted)); see also Courtney Megan Cahill, 
Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 419–20 (describing Justice Kennedy’s focus 
on disgust in Carhart). 
 269 Maroney, supra note 24, at 901. 
270 The Court gave “legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical 
and scientific uncertainty.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (citation omitted). 
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tion—openness that will also improve patient care. Not only does this ap-
proach help combat the woman-protective rationale in litigation, but it might 
also help the abortion rights movement better frame public discussions regard-
ing second-trimester abortion. If the Supreme Court rules in Dobbs that pre-
viability abortion bans can be constitutional, the abortion rights movement will 
need new strategies to defend abortion rights across the country. 
IV. EMBRACING ABORTION DANGERTALK TO REBUT  
THE WOMAN-PROTECTIVE RATIONALE 
Despite its paternalism and inaccuracies, the woman-protective rationale 
has been a successful narrative in justifying abortion regulations, especially in 
the second trimester.271 The success of the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act, 
and the Court’s affirmation of it in Gonzales v. Carhart, should be an ominous 
warning about how the Court would consider these other second-trimester 
abortion laws with similar justifications, especially as the Supreme Court has 
become more conservative and hostile toward abortion rights in recent years. 
We argue in this Part that the silence in canonical abortion rights dis-
course about the uncomfortable aspects of second-trimester abortion has given 
the woman-protective rationale more legitimacy and threatened abortion rights 
in the long term. We suggest that the abortion rights movement should more 
openly discuss the complicated aspects of second-trimester abortion—what 
emerging researchers and abortion providers have called abortion danger-
talk.272 These researchers and abortion providers who coined the term used it 
to refer to aspects of abortion they see every day, but the abortion rights 
movement considers too taboo to discuss openly. Specifically, one article ex-
plained that providers “wrestl[e] with views of abortion as killing, concerns 
(despite evidence against) about abortion causing fetal pain, causing patients 
pain, and the gruesomeness of dealing with fetal parts.”273 
Abortion providers rarely feel free to discuss dangertalk topics openly or 
publicly. Rather, there is an assumption that if providers share their unfiltered 
abortion experiences, this will somehow threaten the success of the abortion 
rights movement. In particular, fear exists that some of these topics will only 
perpetuate current anti-abortion messaging.274 The providers asked a provoca-
tive and radical question in their article: “What would happen if, rather than 
shying away from the difficult, messy parts of abortion, the movement em-
                                                                                                                           
271 See id. at 159 (discussing that women need protection from a choice that may come to regret). 
272 Martin et al., supra note 26, at 80. 
273 Id. (citations omitted).  
274 Id. 
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braced them?”275 After all, “[f]or these providers, struggling emotionally with 
aspects of the work wasn’t troubling––it was how they knew they were still 
thoughtful and engaged with the work.”276 Perhaps the same honesty would 
resonate with the public, many of whom likely struggle with some of these 
same concerns, even those who support abortion rights. Although their original 
article was written to better support abortion providers, the authors also sug-
gested that dangertalk could be a potent tool to rejuvenate the abortion rights 
movement.277 
Our Article sets out to do just that. We borrow the concept of dangertalk 
and build on it. We explain how an embrace of dangertalk topics in the context 
of second-trimester abortion could improve both patient care and rebut the 
woman-protective rationale. In Section A of this Part, we focus on two areas: 
the nature of second-trimester abortion procedures and the complex emotions 
second-trimester abortion can evoke for some patients.278 Instead of openly 
confronting these topics in the public domain, national pro-choice messaging 
typically avoids them and pivots to comfortable talking points related to a 
woman’s autonomy. But this silence has allowed the anti-abortion movement 
to control and monopolize the narrative surrounding these abortions, while also 
suggesting that pro-choice leaders are dishonest and evasive. This avoidance 
also perpetuates abortion stigma by suggesting that women who terminate with 
a D&E or after a prenatal diagnosis should be silent. Ignoring these topics, in 
our opinion, is harming efforts to secure abortion rights. In Section B of this 
Part, we further argue that greater openness about the nature of second-
trimester abortion procedures and the range of possible emotional responses 
following abortion will create the opportunity for more patient choice.279 We 
recognize the risks and challenges associated with this openness, but aim to 
start the conversation of how embracing these taboo topics can actually 
strengthen abortion rights. Put simply, the abortion rights movement can best 
protect women by embracing radical transparency and increased choice in sec-
ond-trimester abortion care. 
A. The Harm of Avoiding the Uncomfortable Truths 
Second-trimester abortion care involves uncomfortable realities that many 
in the abortion rights movement would rather not discuss. This Article focuses 
on two in particular. First, second-trimester abortion procedures involve the 
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 276 Id. at 78. 
277 Id. 
 278 See infra notes 280–325 and accompanying text. 
 279 See infra notes 326–397 and accompanying text. 
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removal of a fetus in parts. Second, abortion generally—and especially in the 
second trimester—can cause complicated emotions, including grief. This Part 
also describes the harms of avoiding these uncomfortable realities. 
In 2008, Lisa Harris, an abortion provider and professor at the University 
of Michigan Medical School, wrote an article entitled, Second Trimester Abor-
tion Provision: Breaking the Silence and Changing the Discourse—a precursor 
to the dangertalk paper, which she also helped author.280 In it, she described the 
“violence in abortion, especially in second trimester procedures,” where the 
fetus is removed in parts.281 Harris speaks openly about the reality of a D&E 
procedure—including the simultaneous awe and disregard she has for the fetal 
parts after the procedure ends. She notes that “there can be legitimate feelings 
that first and second trimester abortions are qualitatively and emotionally dif-
ferent” because “[r]emoving a microscopic fetus and gestational sac is visually 
and viscerally different from removing what looks like a fully formed but 
small baby.”282 
Harris turns a critical eye on the movement she supports and notes that 
“[t]he pro-choice movement has not owned or owned up to the reality of the 
fetus, or the reality of fetal parts.”283 Instead, “the violence and, frankly, the 
gruesomeness of abortion is owned only by those who would like to see abor-
tion (at any time in pregnancy) disappear, by those who stand outside clinics 
and in front of sports arenas holding placards with pictures of fetal parts and 
partially dismembered fetal bodies.”284 Harris has noted that the traditional 
abortion-rights response to images of fetal parts on signs outside of abortion 
clinics is dismissal—that the pictures are not real or that the falsely portray 
what abortions look like.285 It is true that the those images do not represent 
first-trimester abortions, which are the vast majority of abortions, but to the 
medical team performing second-trimester abortions, those poster images may 
realistically look like the images they see during and after the procedure.286 
So how does Harris reconcile her abortion practice with the nature of the 
procedure? At least some of it has to do with her belief—shared by many abor-
tion rights supporters—that “declining a woman’s request for abortion [is] also 
                                                                                                                           
280 Harris, supra note 27, at 74. 
281 Id. at 76. 
282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 77. 
284 Id.; see also Lena R. Hann & Andréa Becker, The Option to Look: Patient-Centered Pregnan-
cy Tissue Viewing at Independent Abortion Clinics in the United States, 28 SEXUAL & REPROD. 
HEALTH MATTERS 500, 501 (2020) (“Most people can only learn about what aborted fetal tissue looks 
like through anti-abortion imagery and misinformation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
285 Harris, supra note 27, at 77; see also ZIEGLER, supra note 17, at 161 (explaining the strategic 
decision to not focus on the specifics of the D&X procedure). 
286 Harris, supra note 27, at 77. 
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. . . an act of unspeakable violence.”287 It is violent to require a woman to en-
dure the significant risks and burdens of pregnancy and childbirth against her 
will, and for a child she does not want.288 The landmark Turnaway Study has 
shown that women denied an abortion not only experience the physical trauma 
of birth, but also the long-term negative effects on their mental and physical 
health, financial stability, and life satisfaction.289 And the irony is that many 
people are disgusted when they hear the specifics of any invasive medical pro-
cedure, including childbirth, which can be quite gruesome.290 Thus, there is no 
easy way out. Both giving and declining a second-trimester abortion involves 
violence—the question is: upon whom will the violence be administered, the 
fetus or the woman? 
We will pause here to note that the question of violence is likely iterative 
of concerns regarding the moral value of the pregnancy. No one would discuss 
the surgical removal of an organ or tumor in terms of violence, regardless of 
how “gruesomely” it was removed. Yet for many people, even those who sup-
port abortion rights, a fetus is categorically different than an organ or tumor 
because it is a potential life.291 And therefore, the way the abortion occurs mat-
ters to these individuals, who might be uncomfortable with the idea of remov-
ing a live fetus in parts, even if the fetus cannot feel pain until much later in 
the pregnancy. Of course, this position is far from universal, and we do not 
want to implicitly endorse any perspective on this matter by adopting the term 
“violence” to describe an abortion procedure. Instead, we discuss the nature of 
second-trimester abortion procedures without relying on any descriptive, evoc-
ative terms. 
The second uncomfortable truth is the possible emotional complexity of 
abortion for some women, a complexity more likely to present in second-
trimester abortion.292 Two dominant narratives exist regarding a woman’s emo-
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tion—reliant on the belief system revealed above—of the status and worth of that fetus.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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tional experience with abortion. The anti-abortion side claims that women feel 
regret, and the abortion rights side claims that women feel relief.293 These nar-
ratives are then used to portray these women either as victims who feel regret 
or as autonomous beings who feel relief.294 Although this is starting to change, 
the traditional abortion rights discourse fails to recognize possibility of other 
emotions, much less the possibility of multiple emotions at once.295 
Though studies consistently demonstrate that the vast majority of women 
who terminate a pregnancy feel relief, this finding is also reductive.296 The re-
lief a women may feel after an abortion does not negate other painful emotions 
that may also exist. “Emotional responses to abortion are complex, and it is 
natural to be simultaneously satisfied with a particular decision and experience 
both painful and positive feelings.”297 One study found that even though relief 
was the most common emotional response to abortion, 30% of women felt 
some (or all) negative emotions after their abortion.298 Emotional complexity is 
even more likely in the second trimester with 57% of women in one study re-
porting both positive and negative emotions, and grief being the most commonly 
reported emotion, reported by 67% of women.299 Though grief was more com-
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 298 Rocca et al., supra note 296, at 4. 
 299 Inga-Maj Andersson et al., Experiences, Feelings and Thoughts of Women Undergoing Second 
Trimester Medical Termination of Pregnancy, PLOS ONE 9 (Dec. 29, 2014), https://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0115957 [https://perma.cc/E5V9-ESNA]. Another study 
noted that “[s]maller proportions of women in the first-trimester group than of those in the near-limit 
 
2192 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2145 
mon in women terminating intended pregnancies, the same study noted that a 
majority of women terminating unintended pregnancies in the second trimester 
also felt grief.300 Women needing second-trimester abortion are also more likely 
to feel anxiety about fetal pain; shame, stigma, and embarrassment due to the 
timing of the abortion; and confusion and wariness due to lack of familiarity 
with the actual mechanics of second-trimester abortion.301 The emphasis on 
relief ignores those other possibly painful feelings and alienates women who 
have them.302 
Abortion rights advocates have been careful to avoid the idea of “post-
abortion grief” out of the fear is that acknowledging abortion grief might be 
improperly equated with abortion regret.303 “But loss and regret are two differ-
ent things.”304 It is entirely possible, and may even be common, for a woman 
to feel that she made the best decision for herself, yet still experience sadness 
or grief. One legal scholar has noted that “the possibility of loss . . . does not 
trigger a moral or a legal claim against abortion. Instead it seeks to open a 
wider space in which to discuss how women may experience aspects of abor-
tion.”305 Acknowledging complex emotional responses is “neither prediction 
nor endorsement; it is simply recognition.”306 “Even from a pro-choice point of 
view, we should understand what it is like for a woman to choose abortion and 
what it is like for her to hold to that choice with an image of her fetus in her 
mind’s eye.”307 This sentiment is only more powerful in the context of second-
trimester abortion when the fetus’s presence may be physically visible outside 
her body and she may have felt it move inside her body. 
Acknowledging and supporting women through these complex emotions, 
is not irreconcilable with the decision to terminate. Studies demonstrate that 
women believe that abortion was the right choice regardless of complex or 
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negative emotions.308 Indeed, 84% of women whose primary emotional re-
sponse to abortion was negative, felt that abortion was the correct choice one 
week later.309 Even among women who reported feeling regret, 89% of them 
thought they had made the right choice one week later.310 “Despite the com-
mon framing of emotional outcomes as either relief or regret, nine in [ten] 
women in the near-limit group who reported regret also reported relief.”311 
This demonstrates that the public framing of post-abortion emotions is incon-
sistent with many women’s lived experiences. 
The national abortion rights messaging avoids both of these uncomforta-
ble truths for the same reason—the risk of ceding ground to the anti-abortion 
movement.312 They may also be worried that openness about the nature of sec-
ond-trimester abortion procedures could harm the women seeking the abortion, 
who remain steadfast in their choice, but feel more distressed about the proce-
dure. Similarly, the abortion rights movement is worried that discussing poten-
tial feelings of loss after an abortion would “be celebrated” by the anti-
abortion side “as an authentic moment of true confession” that the abortion 
was a mistake.313 Though there have been recent efforts to change this dia-
logue, in older “pro-choice scripts, a woman who does feel regret or remorse 
seems at best confused and non-autonomous and at worst a traitor to women’s 
rights or feminism.”314 National messaging still has a long way to go towards 
infusing more nuance into the debate. 
The studied silence approach was famously unsuccessful in Carhart. The 
abortion rights movement made serious errors in defending the D&X abortion 
procedure.315 When confronted with arguments about the “gruesomeness” of 
the procedure, abortion rights activists ignored the particulars of the procedure 
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and attempted to re-focus the discussion exclusively on “politically correct” 
stories—the stories of women who had a D&X after learning of fetal anomaly 
in a wanted pregnancy.316 But this was misleading, as the majority of women 
who had a D&X did so without fetal anomaly, making the movement look dis-
honest and untrustworthy, while at the same time perpetuating the dichotomy 
of the “good” and “bad” abortion. The silent approach also capitulated the nar-
rative to anti-abortion activists—who took advantage of it—inundating Ameri-
cans with the uncontradicted narrative that the procedure itself was inhu-
mane.317 The anti-abortion strategy has long focused on the nature of second-
trimester abortion procedures, ensuring that the public is well aware of the pic-
tures of fetuses and fetal parts.318 They set the stage, painting the picture of ex-
actly how “gruesome” the procedure is. The lack of a response has left the abor-
tion rights movement open to the criticism that they are hiding something.319 
This silence trap is also the paradigmatic way that stigma operates: 
“Stigma keeps people silent about their personal experiences, and silence feeds 
public complacency with political attacks and destructive myths.”320 Thus, lat-
er abortions and abortions on the basis of fetal anomaly become shameful be-
cause they aren’t often discussed.321 Greater openness can help the movement 
destigmatize this care. We acknowledge the valid fears that the public would 
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be troubled by the specifics of second-trimester abortion procedures and would 
not understand memory-making.322 But silence has not kept these uncomforta-
ble truths hidden. 
Perhaps transparency could do better. After all, with the exception of ab-
solutists on both sides of the spectrum, most people’s views on abortion are 
nuanced.323 And acknowledging and recognizing the complexity of abortion 
might humanize the issues. Admittedly, pithy messages—like “my body, my 
choice”—are easier to communicate and comprehend. Transparency about 
second-trimester abortion procedures and the emotional complexity surround-
ing these procedures does not translate into an easily digestible message. But 
one can see threads of our proposal in newer campaigns like, “Shout Your 
Abortion,” where women are attempting to de-stigmatize abortion care gener-
ally.324 These women are telling their stories with the nuance that is often ig-
nored in public messaging. This nuance is vitally important and far superior to 
the stigmatizing silence that capitulates the narrative to the anti-abortion com-
munity.325 
B. Improving Abortion Care by Increasing Choice 
Thus far, we have endorsed a new strategy that more openly confronts the 
nature of second-trimester abortion procedures and the emotional complexity 
that second-trimester abortion can evoke for some women. In this section, we 
argue that this greater openness on the uncomfortable truths of second-
trimester abortion could more effectively rebut the woman-protective rationale 
and improve patient care. We imagine a consent-based framework in which 
women who receive second-trimester abortions are given the option to learn 
more about the specifics of the D&E abortion procedure, alternative proce-
dures, and the option of memory-making. We then describe how this patient-
centered transparency—and the choices that come with it—will do more to 
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rebut the woman-protective rationale than simply refuting the underlying 
premises. 
Though we are advocating for more patient choice, it is worth noting at 
the outset that disclosures in the context of abortion care have a long and frus-
trating history. Abortion has been repeatedly singled out for special treat-
ment.326 Unlike other medical procedures, where doctors are trusted to obtain 
consent before providing the care and policed after-the-fact by tort law, state 
laws often mandate particular disclosures before abortion and require waiting 
periods thereafter. Those mandated disclosures often encourage childbirth over 
abortion or flat out lie: providers might have to disclose, incorrectly, that fetus-
es feel pain, that personhood starts at conception, or that abortion is psycholog-
ically harmful, hurts future fertility, or could cause breast cancer.327 Some 
might worry that suggesting additional disclosures is tone deaf to this reality 
and would only increase the burden on abortion providers. 
We argue below, however, that more information on abortion procedures 
and more resources to help patients process complex emotions could on the 
whole be very helpful for second-trimester patients. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that every patient needs to receive the same information. Outside of le-
gally mandated disclosures, the abortion counseling community already oper-
ates on the presumption that “abortion care is not a one-size-fits-all proposi-
tion” and that patients need to be met where they are.328 Patients are provided 
the counseling that they need. If a woman has already reflected on the decision, 
is certain of her choice, and not experiencing complex emotions about it, she 
should not be forced to sit through additional, unnecessary disclosures that 
may make her feel like her emotional response is inadequate. 
It can be a challenge to identify the patients that need extra counseling 
and resources. Fortunately, some providers have started using tools to help 
them. Some, for instance, use an intake form that asks patients about their level 
of certainty about the abortion and their beliefs about the pregnancy, including 
whether they view the fetus as a child.329 Patients who indicate more uncertain-
ty or moral ambiguity about the abortion will receive more in-depth counsel-
ing. This patient-controlled approach squares nicely with our proposal. In our 
view, every second-trimester abortion patient should have the opportunity to 
learn more about the D&E procedure, possible alternatives, and resources to 
help them process complex emotions. But only if they want or need it. There-
fore, when we explain below how dangertalk subjects should be incorporated 
into patient care, we are doing so with the endorsement of models that allow 
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women to opt out if they do not want to know more. And because the second-
trimester abortion patient population is so small, it should not be overly bur-
densome to provide. 
In Subsection 1, we discuss how transparency beyond informed consent 
with regard to abortion procedures can promote greater patient autonomy and 
patient choice in second-trimester abortion care.330 In Subsection 2, we discuss 
how abortion providers can help patients process complex emotions through 
memory-making.331 
1. Transparency Beyond Informed Consent 
In Carhart, Justice Kennedy suggested that because the decision to termi-
nate is “so fraught with emotional consequence,” some providers may not wish 
to provide patients with details of the procedures, and instead, only disclose 
what is required, such as potential risks of the procedure.332 As Carhart im-
plies, informed consent law does not require transparency about the particulars 
of a procedure.333 For instance, before a patient has their appendix removed, 
physicians are not required to explain the detailed mechanics of the proce-
dure.334 Similarly, informed consent law does not require a doctor to disclose 
the specifics of an abortion procedure. Instead, it simply requires that doctors 
explain the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the procedure, which abortion 
providers do as a matter of course before every abortion.335 
Even if not required, however, explaining the details of the abortion pro-
cedure has real benefits. First, it fights against the critique that abortion pro-
viders are hiding important facts from women. With transparency that exceeds 
legal requirements, the state can no longer claim the need to protect women 
from the regret they will feel once they learn of the “gruesomeness” of the 
D&E procedure.336 If it is “precisely this lack of information concerning the 
way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern to the State,” 
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then giving women this information will remove the state’s woman-protective 
interest.337 It would also rebut the argument that women need to be protected 
from doctors because providers are misleading and hiding information from 
their patients. We suspect this above-and-beyond transparency will be more 
effective than calling out the sexist stereotypes that suggest women need pro-
tection. 
Moreover, the anti-abortion movement has been able to find women to 
testify in amicus briefs that no one disclosed the nature of the D&E before the 
abortion, and that once they learned of the specifics, they regretted their deci-
sion—the same type of stories offered during the D&X litigation.338 These sto-
ries create misleading facts that harm abortion rights in both litigation and the 
public image. If doctors routinely disclosed the particulars of the D&E proce-
dure, these briefs would be more difficult to support.339 Though abortion pro-
viders do not need to dwell on the details of the procedure, women should have 
the opportunity to learn that their fetus will be removed in parts and that, 
though there is no evidence to suggest a fetus can feel pain before twenty-nine 
weeks, the fetus will die during the course of the procedure unless fetal demise 
is induced beforehand.340 
This enhanced transparency also promotes patient autonomy. Only when 
providers disclose comprehensive information can a woman “act[] with true 
procreative liberty” and autonomy.341 Once the disclosure is made about the 
nature of the procedure, women who have genuine concerns may decide not to 
terminate. For instance, some women might feel a connection to their fetus that 
could make them more concerned about how a termination occurs. “It is disin-
genuous to argue that removing a fetus . . . is no different from removing a fi-
broid”—at least for some women.342 If this information could change some 
women’s minds about whether to receive the abortion or what kind of abortion 
they desire, it should be provided. No abortion provider wants women to have 
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an abortion she doesn’t want.343 Though we think very few women would 
reach this conclusion, they should have the information that would allow them 
to. 
This transparency also opens the possibility of greater choice in second-
trimester abortion care. In particular, women should be presented with the var-
ious types of second-trimester abortion so that they can choose between them. 
Giving patients more choices over the procedure would more clearly mirror 
first-trimester abortion practice, where options for both medication abortion or 
surgical abortion exist.344 Currently, in second-trimester abortion care, women 
are typically only given the option of a D&E.345 We believe women should 
have the option of learning about alternatives, including induction abortion and 
the possibility of inducing fetal demise before either a D&E or D&X. An in-
duction abortion or D&X might be particularly helpful or appealing for women 
terminating a wanted pregnancy or those who have emotionally connected 
with their fetus. These women are more likely to experience grief and desire 
closure. For some women, induction abortion could also ease the stigma asso-
ciated with abortion by creating an experience that mimics and even looks like 
stillbirth.346 
But even women who do not feel an emotional connection to their fetus 
might still be anxious about the nature of the procedure. Qualitative research 
demonstrates that some women are more comfortable to know that their fetus 
had died before a D&E began, while other women find it disturbing to carry a 
dead fetus before an abortion.347 Given these varied preferences, the best solu-
tion is to give women the option of fetal demise before an abortion, if she de-
sires. Providing this additional option would rebut the argument presented in 
the states’ briefs that women prefer fetal demise even though it is typically not 
performed, and it should therefore be mandated.348 If a patient chooses fetal 
demise, the provider could also discuss the possibility of a D&X, which would 
become legal. 
Of course, women should also be told of the costs and risks associated 
with these alternative procedures. With respect to fetal demise before a D&X 
or D&E, women should first be told unequivocally that no evidence exists that 
                                                                                                                           
 343 COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 149. 
344 See generally Wendy Simonds et al., Abortion, Revised: Participants in the U.S. Clinical Tri-
als Evaluate Mifepristone, 46 SOC. SCI. MED. 1313 (1998) (describing a woman’s choices and experi-
ences regarding different first-trimester abortion methods). 
345 See generally Donovan, supra note 109 (discussing the implications of banning D&E abortion 
procedures on second-trimester abortions). 
346 Stillbirth, however, can also create its own stigma with some characteristics similar to abortion 
stigma. 
347 McNamara et al., supra note 120, at 517. 
348 SOC’Y FAM. PLAN., supra note 85, at 465–66. 
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a fetus can feel pain in the second trimester—which might relieve any discom-
fort women have at the idea of a D&E or D&X without fetal demise.349 If the 
woman still desires fetal demise, she should be told that the primary method 
for inducing demise involves injecting a life-ending medication into the fetus’s 
heart, and that this procedure involves extra risks and discomfort, increased 
costs, and a longer abortion experience.350 The other method of fetal demise 
does not create addition risks and burdens, but is also less reliable and might 
not work in an individual case. 
As to induction abortion, it can be prohibitively expensive given that it 
often requires days of inpatient care at a hospital.351 Many women may not be 
able to afford this unless their insurance will cover the cost—an unlikely sce-
nario.352 And even if a woman could afford the extremely high out-of-pocket 
cost, most hospitals and clinics do not offer it.353 Induction abortion is also a 
longer, riskier, and potentially more painful procedure that can take days and 
still require surgical removal of the placenta.354 As a result, this will not be the 
ideal method for the vast majority of second-trimester abortions, unless there is 
an indication for fetal autopsy or a strong desire to meet and hold the child. 
This explains why only 2% of second-trimester abortions are done by induc-
tion, but it is the primary method for second and third-trimester abortions after 
twenty weeks in the case of fetal anomaly.355 
It is worth noting that a particular abortion provider might not be able to 
provide all these alternative procedures. Clinics—where 95% of abortions take 
place—do not typically offer induction abortions. Individual providers also 
may not be trained on how to induce fetal demise, or only have training on one 
method for inducing fetal demise. As a result, they may not be able to provide 
the options women seek. And if the provider can induce fetal demise, she 
might still not know how to perform a D&X, if requested. Many women will 
likely not be able to afford options that cost additional money, even if they 
want to. We recognize that in this context, describing to women options that do 
not practically exist may not provide any benefits. We nevertheless paint this 
                                                                                                                           
349 See id. (noting that by best estimates, fetal pain starts around twenty-nine weeks). 
350 Id.; Donley, supra note 56, at 232–33. 
351 Donovan, supra note 109, at 37. 
352 See generally Adam Sonfield, Restrictions on Private Insurance Coverage of Abortion: A 
Danger to Abortion Access and Better Health Coverage, 21 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 29 (2018), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/article_files/gpr2102918.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCT8-
2QJF]. 
353 For instance, many states have prohibited public hospitals from offering abortion services. 
See, e.g., COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 209. 
354 Donovan, supra note 109, at 37. 
 355 SOC’Y FAM. PLAN., CLINICAL GUIDELINE 20111, LABOR INDUCTION ABORTION IN THE SEC-
OND TRIMESTER, in 84 CONTRACEPTION 4, 4 (2011). 
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picture of an ideal world of second-trimester abortion care, where women are 
given meaningful choice, even if we are not there yet. Regardless of whether 
the physician can offer additional choices for women, we still believe that, in 
the interest of transparency and empowered decision-making, women should 
have the choice to learn more about the nature of the abortion procedure and 
alternatives. And providers can always refer the patient to other providers, 
even out of state providers, who offer more choices if the patient desires it. 
2. Recognizing Emotional Complexity Through Optional Memory-Making 
The classic abortion rights narrative is that women feel relief after abor-
tion, which empirically, is the most common and lasting emotional response to 
abortion.356 But focusing on relief as the only emotional response to abortion 
does not further the “overall goal” of supporting a woman’s mental and physi-
cal health.357 To best help and empower women, researchers emphasize the 
need to broaden the discussion of emotional experience—to “not be afraid to 
acknowledge the full range of feelings women have about abortion.”358 Insist-
ing on relief alienates the almost 30% of women who experience more com-
plex emotions, including grief or loss.359 Instead, we must have more open and 
flexible dialogue so that women feel comfortable being honest about their feel-
ings toward abortion.360 “Greater visibility has the potential to improve under-
standings of the ways in which women’s experiences are framed and con-
strained by the dominant narratives of pregnancy and abortion.”361 Of course, 
we are not suggesting that grief or loss are pervasive or proper responses to 
abortion—far from it. Rather, we are suggesting that grief or loss are reasona-
ble responses that can be better supported. 
Recognizing this reality will improve patient care. At the outset, simply 
acknowledging the possibility of complex emotions and holding space for 
women who experience them could help women feel less confused and isolat-
ed when they occur. Many of the best abortion providers—particularly those 
with a second-trimester abortion practice—already do this.362 But more con-
cretely, abortion providers can also offer patients the option of memory-
making to support those who are experiencing loss or grief process their emo-
tions. The idea of memory-making comes from modern medical treatment for 
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357 Weitz et al., supra note 294, at 88. 
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359 Rocca et al., supra note 296, at 4. 
360 Madeira, supra note 293, at 13. 
361 Purcell et al., supra note 38, at 166. 
 362 See COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 109, at 164–70 (describing the experience of providers pray-
ing with patients and helping them work through their feelings). 
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parents after stillbirth; it simply gives parents the opportunity to make memo-
ries with the child.363 Those opportunities can include viewing, holding, or 
spending time with their child, taking pictures, or obtaining mementos, like 
footprints. It can be as extensive or as minimal as the woman desires, and can 
include spiritual or ceremonial acts like prayer, pseudo-baptism, or crema-
tion/burial. Empirical research of parents who have experienced stillbirth con-
firms the benefits of memory-making for processing grief.364 Memory-making 
is also standard within PHPC for parents continuing a pregnancy where the 
baby is not expected to survive long past birth.365 
Numerous anti-abortion state legislatures acknowledge the psychological 
benefits of memory-making. It is one purported reason for why they ban abor-
tion in the context of fetal anomalies or encourage PHPC for women after a 
life-threatening fetal diagnosis. The state’s justification that women are better 
off continuing a pregnancy after a life-threatening fetal diagnosis assumes that 
women can only experience memory-making if they continue the pregnancy 
after the diagnosis. This is incorrect. Memory-making is also possible with 
abortion and would benefit many women who choose abortion in the second 
trimester. In fact, PHPC researchers advocate for memory-making in abortion 
care: 
Those who terminate a desired pregnancy for a [life-limiting fetal di-
agnosis] often experience intense grief that may have some similari-
ties to those who carry to term. Some desire memory-making rituals 
similar to those who carry to term. Whatever the reasons, these fami-
                                                                                                                           
363 See PREGNANCY LOSS & INFANT DEATH ALL., POSITION STATEMENT, BEREAVED PARENTS 
HOLDING THEIR BABY (2008), http://childrensroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/plida_statement_
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364 See Elizabeth Kirkley-Best & Kenneth R. Kellner, The Forgotten Grief: A Review of the Psy-
chology of Stillbirth, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 420, 426 (1982) (describing that research shows 
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tion” (footnotes omitted)); see also Lens, supra note 322, at 966–67 (explaining medical care after 
stillbirth). 
365 PHPC researchers explain that giving parents the opportunity to spend time with their child 
and providing “[t]angible keepsakes promote healthy grieving . . . . Memory-making helps parents to 
weave the baby’s story into the fabric of their lives.” Amy Kuebelbeck & Erin M. Denney-Koelsch, 
Parental Experiences and Needs After Life-Limiting Fetal Diagnosis (footnotes omitted), in PERINA-
TAL PALLIATIVE CARE: A CLINICAL GUIDE, supra note 164, at 70. 
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lies deserve compassionate care throughout their experience, opportu-
nities for memory-making, and expert bereavement support.366 
Some abortion providers already offer this optional care to varying extents.367 
For decades, some abortion clinics and hospitals that provide abortion have 
given women the opportunity to create footprints or see their fetal tissue after 
abortion, including holding an intact fetus if desired.368 Some providers also 
connect a woman to a bereavement doula, who specializes in helping women 
create memories, often free of charge.369 A 2020 study on patient viewing of 
fetal tissue post-abortion specifically noted a possible connection between 
viewing of fetal tissue after abortion and memory-making after stillbirth and 
miscarriage.370 Though memory-making in the context of abortion makes 
many abortion rights supporters uncomfortable, women should be able to ben-
efit from memory-making regardless of whether their pregnancy ends naturally 
or by choice.371And integrating memory-making into abortion care undercuts 
any state’s claim that PHPC is psychologically superior to abortion for women 
after a life-threatening fetal diagnosis because women can access the benefit 
without the corresponding restrictions. 
The availability of some memory-making opportunities depends on the 
type of abortion procedure—meaning that state restrictions on types of proce-
dures not only restrict a woman’s choices, but also her opportunities to make 
memories. This is despite the state’s acknowledgment of the benefits of 
memory-making within PHPC. An induction abortion, for instance, allows a 
woman to hold her baby without any physical scars caused by the abortion 
                                                                                                                           
366 Id. at 64 (footnote omitted); see also Hann & Becker, supra note 284, at 508 (summarizing 
providers’ explanations that “abortions for anomalies require the most empathy and care, and often 
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stillbirth and miscarriage). 
 371 Ludlow, supra note 315, at 28, 46. This avoidance is no different from the reproductive rights’ 
avoidance of miscarriage and stillbirth given that any acknowledgement of a woman’s feelings of loss 
supposedly evidences fetal personhood. Lens, supra note 176, at 4. 
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procedure.372 A D&X abortion allows similar opportunities without the extra 
time, expense, or need for inpatient care, including holding the baby, albeit 
with some trauma to the fetus’s head. Holding the baby is often not possible 
after a D&E because the fetus is not intact, but other memories are possible. 
Women can, for instance, create mementoes from the heartbeat sound, have 
special ultrasound pictures taken, have footprints and handprints made, name 
the child, or have the remains cremated or buried.373 These opportunities for 
memory-making exist regardless of the type of abortion procedure.374 It is also 
possible that a D&E would allow for the viewing of fetal tissue with proper 
counseling on what to expect. 
Most women having a second-trimester abortion, however, are not ending 
a wanted pregnancy. As a result, they may be less likely to desire memory-
making. This Article still advocates, however, for giving all women the choice 
of memory-making within their second-trimester abortion experience.375 Many 
women with undesired pregnancies experienced some uncertainty surrounding 
their decision to terminate in the second trimester.376 As a result, the woman 
likely spent more time thinking about the fetus and imagining her life if she 
continued the pregnancy; in some cases, she might have developed an emo-
tional bond with the fetus as time went on. She might even be showing or have 
felt the fetus move.377 In a study of second-trimester abortion patients, half of 
the patients terminating due to fetal anomaly chose to view the fetus, as did 
39% of women terminating for unintended pregnancy.378 Both women who 
viewed the fetus and those who did not said that they did not regret their 
choice.379 A 2020 survey of clinics offering patient viewing of fetal tissue also 
described that some women feel closure after the viewing.380 
The choice of memory-making can also be empowering for women. Pro-
viders that give patients the option of viewing pregnancy tissue after abortion 
                                                                                                                           
372 See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text (discussing the induction abortion proce-
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believe doing so is part of their mission to allow the patient to make their own 
decisions.381 This practice has been coined “patient centered pregnancy tissue 
viewing” (PCV) to note that it is the patient’s choice, as distinct from legally-
mandated viewings, like laws that force ultrasounds before abortion.382 These 
providers believe that women who choose to view the fetal tissue benefit due 
to “exercising choice and control during the abortion.”383 Providers believe 
that a patient’s “access to information” and the choice to see the fetus are inte-
gral to creating trust in the patient-provider relationship, whether the patient 
looks “to fulfill curiosity, to cope with or grieve the end of a pregnancy, or 
merely to come to terms with the experience.”384 Though fetal viewing may be 
empowering for some, only a minority of women are likely choose it. In Lud-
low’s estimate, only about 5% of women chose to see the “post-procedure fe-
tus,”385 but studies in the second trimester suggest that over a third of women 
might chose it if it were offered.386 Though 75% of clinics offer viewing, three-
quarters of them only do so upon patient request, meaning that many women 
never realized it was an option, potentially diluting this service.387 We are 
aware of no studies that demonstrate the prevalence of other methods for 
memory-making that might be less emotionally difficult—including having 
footprints made or cremating the fetus. 
It is important to note that giving women space and resources to mourn 
their abortions can only be accomplished effectively if women are also free 
from any pressure to grieve when they do not feel complex emotions. If op-
tional memory-making became standardized, a risk of what Professor Carol 
Sanger calls “compulsory . . . mourning” exists.388 When “bereavement prac-
tices become officially entrenched, they may take on a prescriptive quality, 
providing a template for how one is supposed to respond to death.”389 For in-
stance, an Indiana law has been criticized for its requirement that women bury 
or cremate fetal or embryonic remains after an abortion, miscarriage, or still-
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birth as priming women to experience the emotional response of grief, regard-
less of their actual experience.390 Professor Sanger also argued against state-
issued memorial birth certificates after stillbirth due to the risk of compulsory 
mourning.391 Similarly, the very offer of memory-making after abortion could 
make women feel as if they should be grieving. Compulsory mourning is al-
ienating to those who do not have that same response to abortion—those who 
do not feel loss. 
Importantly, the risk of compulsory mourning is lessened if the offer of 
memory-making comes from the doctor or counselor instead of the state. For 
instance, abortion providers already refer to the fetus as a baby only if the 
woman does so.392 It is very different for a doctor to follow the woman’s lead 
by saying “baby” than for the state to officially classify a fetus as a baby or 
mandating the use of the word “baby” in informed consent statutes. Similarly, 
a doctor asking a woman if she is interested in burial or cremation is very dif-
ferent than a state requirement that parents bury their fetus’s remains (and that 
patients or providers pay for it). Even more on point, a doctor advising a wom-
an of the availability of PHPC—which we recommend given its benefits—
does not send the same signal as the state’s requirement that a woman consider 
it—which we denounce. Finally, the consent-based framework we outlined 
above would also allow providers to offer the service only to those patients 
who are interested in learning more about it. 
Finally, the risk of compulsory mourning may also be exaggerated. A 
2020 study explained that there was a dearth of studies available examining 
women’s experiences viewing their fetal tissue, but the few conducted revealed 
that although most women did not wish to see the fetal tissue, they appreciated 
having the choice to view.393 In a study done in Canada, abortion providers 
asked women if they wanted to view the products of conception after the abor-
tion.394 A little over a quarter said “yes.” The majority of women who partici-
pated (83%) reported that the experience did not make their abortion more 
                                                                                                                           
390 Emma Green, State-Mandated Mourning for Aborted Fetuses, THE ATLANTIC (May 14, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/state-mandated-mourning-for-aborted-
fetuses/482688/ [https://perma.cc/2WJS-74TL]. 
391 Sanger, supra note 388, at 301. Professor Lens counters Sanger’s arguments against stillbirth 
birth certificates. See Lens, supra note 176, at 50–52 (discussing the potential out-of-pocket costs for 
autopsies following a stillbirth); see also Lens, supra note 322, at 1008, 1008–09 (discussing the “ten-
sion between abortion and recognition of still birth”). Importantly, like the choice to engage in 
memory-making, stillbirth birth certificates are voluntary. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 192.0022(b)(2) (West 2021) (“[A] parent may obtain a certificate of birth resulting in stillbirth.” 
(emphasis added)). 
392 Ludlow, supra note 315, at 43. 
393 Hann & Becker, supra note 284, at 501. 
394 SANGER, supra note 214, at 148. 
2021] Second-Trimester Abortion Dangertalk 2207 
emotionally difficult, although the study concerned first-trimester abortion.395 
In other words, so long as abortion providers are thoughtful in offering the op-
tions, making clear that many women will not be interested, it shouldn’t neces-
sarily signal expectations that a woman experience a particular response. 
Needless to say, the method by which providers offer women opportuni-
ties for memory-making is important.396 A woman should be told of its availa-
bility while making clear that not all women find any form of memory-making 
helpful, and maybe also that most do not. If women do choose to see the fetus 
as part of memory-making, they must be prepared. “Two clinics specified that 
patients undergoing second-trimester abortions receive more education prior to 
viewing to prepare them for seeing identifiable fetal parts.”397 This additional 
education may be helpful. 
This Section picks up on the work of abortion providers who have sought 
to own the uncomfortable truths about abortion for the sake of above-and-
beyond transparency. We move the conversation forward by noting how em-
bracing abortion dangertalk in the second trimester can rebut the woman-
protective rationale and improve patient care. Though this openness comes 
with some risks, we argue that the benefits to abortion litigation and patient 
care outweigh them. By openly discussing the particulars of second-trimester 
abortion and recognizing the complexity of emotions after abortion, patients 
can have more options in their care and make more informed choices. And an-
ti-abortion activists and states will be less able to argue that women need pro-
tection in the form of restrictive abortion laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Abortion rights, especially in the second trimester, are more vulnerable 
than ever. A swath of second-trimester abortion laws is likely headed for the 
Supreme Court, and they all rely—at least in part—on the argument that the 
laws are necessary to protect women. The uncomfortable truths associated with 
second-trimester abortion, including the nature of second-trimester abortion 
procedures and the possibility of complex emotions about the abortion, makes 
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the woman-protective rationale more intuitive to some. The traditional abortion 
rights narrative avoids these uncomfortable truths. In this Article, we argue that 
the abortion rights movement and second-trimester abortion patients would 
both be better served by more openness regarding the nature of second-
trimester abortion procedures and the possible range of emotional responses to 
the abortion. Avoidance of these dangertalk topics only capitulates the narra-
tive on second-trimester abortion to the anti-abortion movement, who use the 
silence of abortion rights activists to their advantage. On the other hand, 
above-and-beyond transparency on these topics will counter the woman-
protective rationale and improve patient care. We imagine a world in which 
patients have the option to learn more about second-trimester abortion proce-
dures and are offered more choices in their care, including alternative proce-
dures and the possibility of memory-making. 
